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INTRODUCTION 
This Article is a historic account of the hopes and dreams that 
a mother had for her children and her efforts to make those 
hopes and dreams come true. The mother, Minnie Liddell, 
never imagined, when she first became a mom in 1959, or 
years later after the birth of her fifth child, or even after she 
filed a lawsuit against a city school district, that she would 
become a pioneer and icon in the school desegregation history 
of St. Louis, Missouri. She really only wanted a quality public 
education for her children, for black children, for all children. 
This Article will tell the story of Mrs. Liddell‘s quest for a 
quality education for her children, and it will take a look at 
where that journey stands today. 
Minnie Liddell came to St. Louis with her mother, from 
Mississippi, just months after her birth.
1
 As she grew and attended the 
St. Louis public school system, it was clear to her teachers that she 
was a smart child. Because of segregation laws in St. Louis, however, 
Minnie was confined to both segregated and unequal schools. When 
her mother became ill in Minnie‘s junior year of high school, Minnie 
dropped out of school to work full time. Shortly thereafter she met 
and married her future husband. The couple‘s first child was born in 
1959, the second in 1960, the third in 1961, the fourth in 1963, and 
her fifth child in 1976.
2
 The mother of five not only worked hard but 
 
 1. Dale Singer, Mother on the March Portraits of St. Louis; Fourth in a Series, Minnie 
Liddell, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, May 31, 1998, at D1 [hereinafter Singer, Mother on the 
March]. Throughout this Article, I will refer to Minnie Liddell interchangeably as Minnie 
Liddell, Mrs. Liddell, and mostly just ―Minnie.‖ This latter reference is not a sign of disrespect. 
Everyone interviewed for this article, including Mrs. Liddell‘s youngest son, Michael Liddell, 
told me that she would always tell people to call her ―Minnie.‖ 
 2. Singer, Mother on the March, supra note 1.  
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she went on to receive her high school equivalency degree. She even 
studied to become a paralegal.
3
 As her children began to reach school 
age, she started to become very concerned about the quality of 
education her children would receive. She did not want her children 
to attend the unequal schools of her past. In her day, the ―white 
schools were better equipped, better maintained and received new 
textbooks while the black students were often housed in inferior, 
overcrowded schools and had to make do with books previously used 
by white students.‖4 She did not want this for her children. 
Minnie Liddell wanted a quality education for her children and the 
other black children in her community. It was these children, after all, 
who even upon a cursory glance, one could see were not getting 
anywhere near the same benefits as white children. And so, Mrs. 
Liddell‘s journey began eighteen years after Brown v. Board of 
Education (Brown I) was decided.
5
 On February 18, 1972, Minnie 
Liddell and several other concerned African-American parents filed a 
class action lawsuit against the Board of Education for the City of St. 
Louis in St. Louis federal district court. The purpose of that lawsuit, 
as expressed by Minnie Liddell on so many occasions, was to obtain 
a quality education for her children and ―all other school age children 
and their parents similarly situated in the City of St. Louis.‖6 That 
lawsuit played out in the courts for over a quarter of a century. 
Washington University School of Law marked the fortieth 
anniversary of the filing of the lawsuit with a commemorative 
conference in honor of Minnie Liddell, her life, and her work on 
behalf of the children of St. Louis City public schools. This Article, a 
product of that conference, will recount her struggle and will look at 
where St. Louis stands today on the path to a quality education. 
This Article is divided into three parts. Part I will recount the 
historic twenty-seven-year journey of the Liddell case. I will explore 
the circumstances that led Minnie Liddell to galvanize parents and 
 
 3. Robert W. Tabscott, Minnie Liddell‘s Quest, ST. LOUIS BEACON (Sept. 29, 2009), 
https://www.stlbeacon.org/#!/content/20621/minnie_liddells_quest. 
 4. GERALD W. HEANEY & SUSAN UCHITELLE, UNENDING STRUGGLE: THE LONG ROAD 
TO AN EQUAL EDUCATION IN ST. LOUIS 15 (2004). 
 5. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 6. Complaint, Liddell v. Bd. of Educ., No. 72C100(1) (E.D. Mo. 1972) [hereinafter 
Complaint]. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 40:1 
 
 
ultimately file a lawsuit against the Board of Education of the City of 
St. Louis.
7
 That lawsuit was not resolved until two important 
Supreme Court decisions in the 1990s laid the foundation for public 
school districts to extricate themselves from continued and 
potentially unending desegregation efforts. Those cases provided 
fodder for the Attorney General of the State of Missouri to move to 
declare that the public schools in St. Louis had reached a unitary 
status, i.e., were no longer dual education systems based on race. The 
Attorney General‘s actions renewed efforts to bring closure to the 
litigation, and all parties, over thirty in number by this time, agreed to 
settle the case once and for all.
8
 Part II will look more closely at 
where the journey for a quality public school education finds itself in 
St. Louis today. This will require a look at three events: (1) the St. 
Louis Public School District‘s (SLPSD) loss of accreditation in 2007; 
(2) the aftermath of a 2010 Missouri Supreme Court decision, Turner 
v. School District of Clayton (Turner)
9
 —an opinion that appeared to 
give hope that Minnie Liddell‘s dream of a quality education was 
finally to materialize, though as explored, infra, that hope was both 
short-lived and illusory; and (3) the October surprise: the granting of 
provisional accreditation status to the SLPSD. Part III will conclude 
with the sad reality that St. Louis children remain plagued with 
substandard and segregated public education, and neither the 
presence nor repeal of the statute at the heart of Turner nor the 
granting of provisional accreditation to the SLPSD has changed this 
fact. Quality education remains a dream deferred forty years after 
Minnie Liddell‘s crusade began.  
 
 7. Complaint, supra note 6. The history of this lawsuit, from its beginning in 1972 
through the final settlement in 1999, is expertly and meticulously told in the book, Unending 
Struggle: The Long Road to an Equal Education in St. Louis. See HEANEY & UCHITELLE, supra 
note 4. 
 8. Liddell v. Bd. of Educ., No. 4:72CV100 SNL, 1999 WL 33314210 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 
12, 1999) (Memorandum and Order Approving Settlement Agreement). 
 9. 318 S.W.3d 660 (Mo. 2010). 
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I. THE HISTORIC STRUGGLE IN ST. LOUIS FOR A QUALITY 
EDUCATION: MINNIE LIDDELL‘S JOURNEY 
So I simply started ringing doorbells and talking to my—
because all of us up in that area were being put out of that 
school. And I began to walk and ring doorbells and see if other 
parents were as upset by this as I was.
10
 
Missouri, formerly a slave state, at one time prohibited the 
education of black children.
11
 After the Civil War, Missouri laws 
were changed so that African-American children could be educated, 
but they were to be educated separately from white children.
12
 
Separate education by race was incorporated into the state‘s 
constitution in 1875, and that provision remained a part of the 
Missouri Constitution until its repeal in 1976, over twenty years after 
the Supreme Court ruled in Brown I that separate education was 
inherently unequal and violated the United States Constitution.
13
 All 
five of Minnie Liddell‘s children were born after Brown I was 
 
 10. HEANEY & UCHITELLE, supra note 4, at 2 (quoting Minnie Liddell). 
 11. In 1847, the Missouri General Assembly passed a law succinctly stating that, ―[n]o 
person shall keep or teach any school for the instruction of negroes or mulattoes, in reading or 
writing, in this State.‖ Act of February 16, 1847, § 1, 1847 Mo. Laws 103. See also Adams v. 
United States, 620 F.2d 1277, 1280 (8th Cir. 1980). 
 12. With the end of the Civil War in 1865, various laws relating to slavery were changed 
in Missouri. Most importantly for this purpose, not only was slavery abolished in the revised 
Missouri Constitution, but a provision was inserted legalizing the education of African-
American children. While the provision did not require segregation, it often led to segregation. 
The constitution then provided that ―separate schools may be established for children of African 
descent.‖ MO. CONST. 1865, art. IX, § 2 (emphasis added). ―Inserting the word ‗may‘ in this 
provision, while indicating a vague conviction toward Negro schools, opened the way for white 
and black students to attend the same school in scattered instances.‖ Henry Carson Williams, 
The Status of Minority Public Education in Missouri from 1820 to 1954: A Legal History 60 
(1977) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, St. Louis University) (on file with author). An 
amendment was offered that would substitute the word ―shall‖ for ―may,‖ but it was defeated 
by a vote of thirty-two to eight. Arthur Eugene Lee, Public Education in Post-Bellum Missouri 
11 (1976) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Missouri-Columbia) (on file with 
author). The mandatory language eventually ruled the day. The constitution was amended again 
in 1875. This time it required segregation of the races: ―separate free public schools shall be 
established for the education of children of African descent.‖ MO. CONST. 1875 art. XI, § 3 
(emphasis added). 
 13. Brown I, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The Attorney General of Missouri declared Missouri‘s 
constitutional separation provision ―unenforceable‖ immediately after Brown I was decided. It 
would be a full twenty-three years before the Missouri Constitution was amended. Adams, 620 
F.2d at 1280. 
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decided and during a time when the state constitution still gave 
constitutional validity to educational segregation based on race.  
Unlike the school boards of many southern states, the Board of 
Education of the City of St. Louis did prepare for desegregation 
before Brown I was actually decided.
14
 The Board adopted a three-
step plan that would phase in integration between 1954 and 1956.  
The first step provided for desegregation at the junior college, 
teachers college level and in those classes which provided 
services on a city-wide basis. . . . The second step provided for 
desegregation of all high schools (except for the technical high 
schools) and also for desegregation of the adult education 
program. The third step provided for desegregation of the two 
existing technical high schools and all regular elementary 
schools.
15
  
The plan went further to abolish all references to race and assigned 
students to schools based on where the students lived.
16
 While the 
steps appeared racially neutral and integrative, the Board also enacted 
―general principles‖ to help guide the integration process. While the 
principles were generally designed to relieve overcrowding, those not 
interested in integration found ways to take advantage of the 
loopholes and keep their children in chosen schools.
17
 New 
attendance zones also maintained the racial color lines of the past. 
The plan, then, actually did nothing to integrate schools. As the 
Eighth Circuit described: 
After Brown, the St. Louis Board of Education declared that it 
would implement a plan designed to desegregate its system. 
The heart of that plan was said to be the ―neighborhood school 
concept.‖ School attendance zones were redrawn and students 
were generally assigned to schools close to their homes. The 
zones were nearly identical with the boundaries of racially 
identifiable neighborhoods. Moreover, a ―continuation 
transfer‖ option was made available to all students then 
 
 14. Adams, 620 F.2d at 1280.  
 15. Liddell v. Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1304, 1316 (E.D. Mo. 1979). 
 16. Id. See also Adams, 620 F.2d at 1281. 
 17. HEANEY & UCHITELLE, supra note 4, at 11, 72–79. 
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enrolled, permitting them to remain in the school in which they 
were then enrolled until graduation, unless overcrowding 
would result.  
The new plan did not change the segregated nature of the St. 
Louis school system. . . . [S]chools that had all-black student 
and faculty populations prior to Brown continued to be all 
black or virtually all black after the 1955 plan went into effect. 
Most pre-Brown white schools located in the black 
neighborhoods, however, turned virtually all black 
immediately after the plan was implemented.
18
 
Additionally, most of the city‘s black public school students, even 
after Brown I, attended schools in old, dilapidated buildings, their 
textbooks were both used and outdated, their classrooms were 
substantially overcrowded, and their teachers did not always have the 
same educational readiness or credentials as white teachers.
19
 This is 
 
 18. Adams, 620 F.2d at 1281 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). 
 19. See, e.g., HEANEY & UCHITELLE, supra note 4, at 14–15, 71–72, 75. Many of these 
problems persisted even in the late 1980s. Consider the following:  
The schools have not received major repairs in the memory of most of the staffs. Roofs 
leak in over half the schools. The leaks receive only temporary attention. In classroom 
after classroom, in gymnasiums, in libraries and study halls and in cafeterias, water is 
everywhere. It drips from the ceiling, down the walls and even from light fixtures.  
 Cans, buckets and other receptacles are all over. A sixth grader in a reading class 
leans over in her chair to avoid the steady drip of water going into a bucket at her feet. 
 Some of the plumbing is intolerable. On one occasion in a school when the water 
was flushed from a urinal, portions came down a wall in the room below, while a 
devoted teacher was attempting to teach her students in that room. 
 Ceiling tile in many rooms no longer exists or is so permeated with water that it 
hangs perilously. Plaster falls to the floor sometimes placing the student or teacher in 
some danger.  
 Paint peels from many walls and exposes the plaster or wall board and sometimes 
the studs.  
 Many buildings are old and dilapidated and were designed for education seventy-
five years ago. Some have no gymnasiums. Others have gymnasiums, but the ceilings 
are only seven or eight feet high. In many schools, a student must bend or duck going 
from some rooms to others to avoid hitting exposed pipes or mechanical supports. 
Liddell v. Bd. of Educ., 674 F. Supp. 687, 689 (E.D. Mo. 1987); see also Rogers, 16 Schools 
Ordered Closed, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Sept. 4, 1987, at 1A, col. 1; Rogers, Judge‘s 
Homework Pays Off In School Plan, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Sept. 6, 1987, at 1C, cols. 2–4. 
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the environment Minnie Liddell faced as her children prepared to 
attend the St. Louis city public schools.
20
  
Minnie and her husband Charles lived in north St. Louis city 
throughout their children‘s public school years. In the early 1960s, as 
is the case now, north St. Louis city was inhabited predominately by 
black residents. While some believe that housing patterns are the 
result of choice,
21
 choice really cannot be advanced as a credible 
response to the situation in St. Louis in the late twentieth century. 
Rather, after Reconstruction, after World War II, and during Jim 
Crow, various governmental policies (at all levels: federal, state, 
local), as well as the private actions of many in power, steered and 
controlled the confinement of the black population to the north St. 
Louis area.
22
 The results of those policies remain in effect today.
23
 
The couple‘s oldest child, Craton, was born in 1959. His 
elementary school experience provides a perfect example of how 
black children attending public schools in St. Louis attended assigned 
schools at the whim of the Board of Education of the City of St. 
Louis. Craton attended one school for kindergarten, another school 
for first, second, and third grades, and a third school for fourth and 
fifth grades.
24
 He often attended overcrowded schools in dangerous 
 
 20. Singer, Mother on the March, supra note 1, at D1.  
 21. Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 (PICS), 551 
U.S. 701, 750 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) (―Although presently observed racial imbalance 
might result from past de jure segregation, racial imbalance can also result from any number of 
innocent private decisions, including voluntary housing choices.‖ (citing Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 25–26 (1971); Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 116 
(1995)). 
 22. See, e.g., HEANEY & UCHITELLE, supra note 4, at 16 (footnotes omitted) where the 
authors noted:  
The demographics and city planning strategies of St. Louis help to explain the 
slowness and ineffectiveness of the integration process. Local, state, and federal 
governments all played a part in perpetuating segregation after 1954. The city of St. 
Louis failed to enforce building codes in predominantly black neighborhoods, 
insurance companies and lenders ―redlined‖ certain neighborhoods, and newspapers 
continued to print ―colored‖ housing ads separately from ads for whites. 
See also Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). For an excellent discussion of the role 
governments and private industry played in limiting black mobility, economic growth, and 
educational opportunity, see COLIN GORDON, MAPPING DECLINE: ST. LOUIS AND THE FATE OF 
THE AMERICAN CITY (Glenda Gilmore et al. eds., 2008).  
 23. See, e.g., GORDON, supra note 22.  
 24. Singer, Mother on the March, supra note 1. Transfers were hard on the children and 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol40/iss1/2
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buildings with inadequate resources. To relieve the overcrowding, the 
Board resorted to a policy of old known as ―intact busing.‖25 Intact 
busing: 
[I]s a technique that daily sends an entire class of students, 
with their teacher, from an overcrowded school to a vacant 
classroom elsewhere. The technique was used to combat 
overcrowding in the pre-Brown era with white students being 
bused to white schools and black students to black schools. 
Because the 1954–1956 redistricting temporarily reduced 
overcrowding, intact busing was used sparingly from 1955 to 
1957. In 1959, however, intact busing again became significant 
and over 1,000 students were so bused. This number grew to 
more than 6,000 by 1963. The bused students were treated 
administratively as part of the school from which they came 
rather than the school to which they were sent. Consequently, 
they often arrived, recessed, ate lunch and departed on 
different schedules than the other students in the receiving 
school. They thus became an isolated subset of the school in 
which they were housed. Significantly, in the post-Brown era 
most of the students affected by this policy were black students 
sent to white schools.
26
 
Black parents were vehemently opposed to intact busing.
27
 Below 
reflects a sample of the concerns parents had with the way their 
children were treated: 
[B]lack and white children had separate lunch periods . . . and 
drank from water fountains at designated times[.] [B]lack 
children were required to wait for school buses outside of the 
schoolyard while white children played inside the yard[.] 
[W]hite children were taught by white teachers and black 
 
parents. News reporter Dale Singer noted that in addition to the multiple transfers of the 
children, the overcrowded conditions, lack of resources, dilapidated surroundings, and the 
stonewalling by the Board of Education, some of the Liddell children were beaten up by 
classmates in the different schools. The Liddell parents even had their car tires flattened one 
night as they attended at PTA meeting at one of the schools. Id.  
 25. Adams, 620 F.2d at 1288. 
 26. Id. (emphasis added). 
 27. HEANEY & UCHITELLE, supra note 4, at 77. 
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children by black teachers. Others allege that black children 
had to enter the school building through a separate door.
28
 
Craton Liddell, too, was subjected to intact busing.
29
 Of course, 
even intact busing was not a final solution, and it was not long before 
he and his siblings were reassigned again, this time to the Yeatmann 
elementary school. Despite the fact that Yeatmann was overcrowded, 
Minnie Liddell was pleased with the school because it was in a new 
building, it was closer to home, and the principal cared about the 
children.
30
 The Liddell children were not at Yeatmann long before yet 
another dreaded transfer notice came in the mail: the children would 
be transferred to Bates elementary, a school much farther away from 
the Liddell home and in an area Minnie Liddell later described as 
―bombed out.‖31 Indeed, the Bates school had previously been closed 
because of its poor condition, a condition that had not changed when 
the Board of Education decided to relocate students there.
32
  
The constant transferring of her children and the overcrowded 
conditions and dilapidated buildings weighed heavily on Minnie, and 
she had had enough. Minnie started ringing doorbells, talking to her 
neighbors and polling her neighborhood to see if other parents were 
as tired as she was with the instability and inferior education that 
their children were receiving. With Minnie‘s persistence and 
guidance, parent meetings were held, and a group known as the 
Concerned Parents of North St. Louis (Concerned Parents) was 
formed with Minnie Liddell as its leader.
33
 The parents were very 
concerned about a pattern they noticed: although school boundary 
lines were constantly changing, those changes always managed to 
keep black children in black schools, or, in the case of intact busing, 
in segregated classrooms. The Concerned Parents attempted to meet 
with the School Board but were ignored. There were four black 
school board members at the time, but they ―not only skipped the 
 
 28. Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 29. Id. at 15. 
 30. Singer, Mother on the March, supra note 1.  
 31. Id. 
 32. HEANEY & UCHITELLE, supra note 4, at 15. 
 33. Singer, Mother on the March, supra note 1. 
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[requested] meeting; they ignored the invitation.‖34 As Minnie would 
later say: ―The board really thought that if they ignored us, we would 
go away. That was the way they had handled parents‘ protests in the 
past. They would just wait you out.‖35 
These parents, however, with Minnie as their leader, would not go 
away. Minnie vowed to be a ―fly in the authorities‘ butter milk.‖36 
The parents took up pickets outside of the school and eventually 
boycotted by withdrawing their children from school and 
homeschooling them. Half of the student body participated in the 
boycott and stayed home. Overcrowding was solved temporarily, but 
many parents were forced to capitulate, and their children ended up 
taking the bus to the overcrowded, structurally unsound Bates 
elementary school across town.
37
 The rest of the parents continued 
with their boycott—lasting six weeks in total—until school officials 
agreed to send the children to another school.
38
 The parents were 
allowed to pick whatever school they wanted. The Liddells chose 
Simmons elementary, which was the school Charles Liddell had 
attended.
39
 The Board refused to provide transportation for any 
school other than Bates, however, so Charles Liddell drove his 
children back and forth to school every day. Then a funny thing 
happened: the School Board attempted to relocate a small group of 
white students from one school in south St. Louis to another school in 
the same area. When the parents of these children protested, all 
efforts to transfer the students immediately ceased, and the white 
parents were given what they wanted.
40
 This did not sit well with 
black parents in north St. Louis. Refueled by this indignation, the 
Concerned Parents renewed their demands to fight for better schools 
in their community. They continued, however, to face resistance from 
the School Board. As Minnie recalled: 
 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Tabscott, supra note 3. 
 37. Singer, Mother on the March, supra note 1. 
 38. Id. 
 39. HEANEY & UCHITELLE, supra note 4, at 18. 
 40. Singer, Mother on the March, supra note 1. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 40:1 
 
 
They‘d sit there real stone-faced. Then the president hit the 
gavel and he said, ―Next!‖ I kind of changed the structure of 
their meetings, though. They couldn‘t make me sit down. I 
talked as long as I wanted to, and I said what I wanted to say. I 
think [the president of the Board] thought I was crazy for a 
long time. The more we were rebuffed, the more angry I 
became. I saw these people with the total control of my 
children‘s lives and futures in their hands, and none of them 
really gave a damn.
41
 
A point came in time when the School Board agreed to meet 
privately with the Concerned Parents but only with Minnie and her 
husband. In that meeting, the acting Superintendent told Mrs. Liddell 
that he had ―been working in this school system for twenty-seven 
years [and she wouldn‘t be able to] change a thing. . . . [She couldn‘t] 
change anything in this system.‖42 It was after this meeting, Mrs. 
Liddell later recalled, that she decided to change things.
43
 The first 
meeting of parents was at Minnie Liddell‘s house.44 The group grew, 
and they looked to the community for support. To their surprise, they 
met great resistance again. Many in the black community were not 
responsive,
45
 the four black school board members would not meet 
with the parents,
46
 black teachers were offended because they 
believed the parents were questioning their competency,
47
 and the 
NAACP specifically turned the parents away.
48
 Of that rejection, 
Mrs. Liddell recalled as follows: 
[The president of the local chapter of the NAACP] looked at us 
like we was crazy. He said, ―Schools in St. Louis are not 
segregated. The NAACP took care of that in the ‗60s. We met 
 
 41. Id.  
 42. HEANEY & UCHITELLE, supra note 4, at 19. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Interview with Michael Liddell, in St. Louis, Mo. (May 19, 2011) [hereinafter Liddell 
Interview]. 
 45. Tabscott, supra note 3. 
 46. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
 47. HEANEY & UCHITELLE, supra note 4, at 80. 
 48. Liddell, 469 F. Supp. at 1310 n.1. 
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with them and they changed their policy.‖ I told [him] they 
may have changed their policy, but that is all they changed.
49
 
The parents found two lawyers, William Russell and Joseph 
McDuffy, who agreed to represent the parents pro bono if they agreed 
to help with the research and raise money to cover the court filing 
fee. And the parents did: they held barbeques, dances, and bake sales 
to raise the money, and the lawsuit was filed on February 18, 1972.
50
 
A few short years later, the parties entered into a Consent Decree. 
The Decree was published in the St. Louis Daily Record, and a 
ninety-day period was provided for others to file suggestions to the 
desegregation plan set forth therein.
51
 Several groups, including most 
importantly, the St. Louis Chapter of the NAACP, objected and 
moved to intervene in the lawsuit.
52
 Although the intervention 
motions had the effect of stopping the Decree from going into effect 
as such, the Board did implement many of the intra-district remedies 
envisioned by that decree, including a very successful form of intra-
district magnet schools.
53
 
The district court initially denied the motions to intervene as 
untimely, but that ruling was overruled by the Eighth Circuit.
54
 
Intervention by the NAACP completely changed the dynamics of the 
case. Minnie Liddell and the Concerned Parents were primarily 
focused on a quality education. For them, this meant up-to-date 
 
 49. HEANEY & UCHITELLE, supra note 4, at 87. 
 50. Dale Singer, Symposium Will Look Back 40 Years at School Desegregation Case, ST. 
LOUIS BEACON (Mar. 20, 2012), https://www.stlbeacon.org/#!/content/23434/minnie_031912 
?cover page=414. 
 51. Liddell v. Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1304, 1389–90 (E.D. Mo. 1979). Interestingly, 
the magnet schools concept, which was a part of this Decree and eventually became an 
important part of the inter-district settlement, was Minnie‘s idea. See, e.g., HEANEY & 
UCHITELLE, supra note 4, at 86. 
 52. HEANEY & UCHITELLE, supra note 4, at 86. Recall that the NAACP earlier rejected 
Mrs. Liddell‘s request for help. See, e.g., Singer, Mother on the March, supra note 1.  
 53. Interview with Kenneth Brostron, Attorney for the Board of Education, City of St. 
Louis during the Liddell lawsuit, in St. Louis, Mo. (May 31, 2012) [hereinafter Brostron 
Interview]. 
 54. Although the motions were originally denied by the district court because they were 
untimely filed, the Eighth Circuit reversed. See Liddell v. Caldwell (Liddell I), 546 F.2d 768, 
774 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 914 (1977). The teachers‘ unions were also denied 
intervention by the district court, but they never appealed. See, e.g., Liddell, 469 F. Supp. at 
1310. 
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school books in satisfactory conditions, adequate resources, qualified 
and well paid teachers, structurally sound facilities, and safe 
transportation when required.
55
 Mrs. Liddell was concerned with 
―parity in the expenditures for public schools‖ and ―she swore [that] 
to the day of her death . . . she would be kicking and screaming to 
achieve equality in education for all children.‖56 She also was an 
advocate of neighborhood schools.
57
 She liked her children being 
close to home and preferred quality education close to home.
58
 The 
NAACP, though, was concerned not just with quality schools but 
with integrated schools.
59
 With the larger focus on integration and 
with a much smaller white student population then living in the City 
of St. Louis, neighborhood schools really were not an option.
60
 Both 
the NAACP and the Board of Education for the City of St. Louis, 
then, forced consideration of inter-district relief by separately filing 
lawsuits against twenty-three suburban districts near the St. Louis 
City borders claiming that they, too, had participated in the racial 
segregation of students in the metropolitan St. Louis area.
61
 Aside 
from the various governmental policies that intensified segregation 
throughout St. Louis,
62
 there was evidence to support the theory that 
 
 55. Liddell Interview, supra note 44. Of course, this was not the first time that the 
NAACP goals differed from those of black parents in school desegregation efforts. For a similar 
account of the struggle between black parents in Atlanta and the NAACP, see TOMIKO BROWN-
NAGIN, COURAGE TO DISSENT: ATLANTA AND THE LONG HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS 
MOVEMENT (2011). 
 56. Singer, Mother on the March, supra note 1.  
 57. Editorial, Craton Liddell‘s Legacy, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 20, 2003, at B6 
[hereinafter Craton Liddell‘s Legacy]. 
 58. Liddell Interview, supra note 44. 
 59. Interview with Michael Middleton, Attorney for the NAACP during the Liddell 
lawsuit, in Columbia, Mo. (July 29, 2009). The NAACP‘s financial resources were much 
greater than those of the Liddell plaintiffs‘ lawyers. The size, financial benefits, and experience 
of the NAACP, while often a source of tension with the Liddell plaintiffs, ultimately ruled the 
day. And this, Michael Middleton believes, was ultimately for the best. Mr. Middleton is 
convinced that without the NAACP, the Liddell plaintiffs‘ lawyers simply would not have been 
able to withstand the Goliath strength of the State of Missouri and Board of Education of the 
City of St. Louis. Mr. Middleton also believed then, and believes now, that an integrated school 
system is better than a non-integrated one. Id.  
 60. Liddell I, 546 F.2d at 772 (―the total student population for the school term of 1975–
1976 was 88,499 with the ratio of students being approximately 70% black and 30% white‖). 
 61. Brostron Interview, supra note 53.  
 62. See generally GORDON, supra note 22. 
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suburban school districts had also participated in unlawful racial 
segregation. As the Eighth Circuit noted: 
St. Louis County suburban school districts, pursuant to state 
law prior to Brown, collaborated with each other and with the 
City of St. Louis to ensure the maintenance of segregated 
schools. See Act of April 9, 1917, 1917 Mo. Laws 498 
(repealed 1957) (providing for the ―Colored Consolidated High 
School District‖ of St. Louis County); Act of February 17, 
1865, § 13, 1865 Mo. Laws 170 (repealed 1957) (providing, 
inter alia, for the inter-district transfer of ―colored children‖). 
Included among the pre-Brown practices of these districts was 
the assignment and transportation of black students living in 
the suburbs to black schools in the City.
63
 
The lawsuit, however, toiled in the system for five years before a 
trial was finally held. During that five-year period, the Liddells had to 
get a second telephone line because Minnie was fielding so many 
calls about the case. Some of those calls included very nasty ones 
which hurled venom and vile, ―nigger this, and nigger that,‖ slurs, 
and even threats.
64
 Craton also hated his name on the case, and he did 
not appreciate the extra attention.
65
 Minnie‘s children begged her to 
walk away because of the toll the case had on their family and their 
social lives, but she told them walking away was something she could 
not do.
66
 Finally, after five years of waiting, the first day of the trial 
began: 
Bernice Yarber, whose daughter Deborah also was a plaintiff 
in the case, had shopped with Minnie for a three-piece red suit 
to make a majestic impression on the witness stand. ―She was 
very stately,‖ Yarber said. ―She walked into a building that 
belonged to her, in front of a judge whose salary she paid.‖ 
Dorothy Springer, a white parent who started as an antagonist 
and ended up a friend—as well as a member of the School 
Board—was in the courtroom the day that Minnie walked in. It 
 
 63. Adams, 620 F.2d at 1293. 
 64. Singer, Mother on the March, supra note 1.  
 65. Craton Liddell‘s Legacy, supra note 57. 
 66. Singer, Mother on the March, supra note 1. 
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was Oct. 20, 1977. ―She filled the doors,‖ Springer said. ―It 
almost looked like the doors weren‘t big enough for her 
presence. Her voice was firm. It had conviction. It had 
compassion.‖67 
But the trial was a severe disappointment. Proceedings on the 
merits of potential constitutional violations on the part of the 
suburban districts were stayed early on in the litigation.
68
 The trial 
proceeded against the Board of Education of the City of St. Louis and 
the State of Missouri. After a thirteen-week trial with forty witnesses, 
1,200 trial exhibits and over 7,000 pages of transcript, the district 
court found no constitutional violation by the Board of Education.
69
 
The Eighth Circuit reversed. It specifically found that both the Board 
of Education of the City of St. Louis and the State had maintained 
racially segregated educational systems.
70
 The case was remanded to 
the district court with a strong manifesto: 
Segregation in the elementary and secondary schools in St. 
Louis must now be eliminated. An integrated system must be 
devised and implemented promptly. In no other way can the 
constitutional right to an equal educational opportunity be 
assured to all children of St. Louis. With careful planning, 
expert advice, broad community participation and good faith, a 
plan to integrate the schools can be devised and implemented 
which will meet constitutional requirements.
71
 
Shortly after the case was returned to the district court, a 
desegregation planning committee was established, which included 
Minnie Liddell and nineteen others. The job of the committee was to 
produce a citywide busing plan to be executed a few months later in 
time for the next academic year. The meetings included black parents 
 
 67. Id.  
 68. See D. Bruce La Pierre, Voluntary Inter-district School Desegregation In St. Louis: 
The Special Master‘s Tale, 1987 WIS. L. REV. 971, 979–80 n.25 (1987); see also Liddell v. Bd. 
of Educ., 677 F.2d 626, 640 n.38 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 877 (1982) (assuring 
the suburban districts that inter-district liability issues would only be determined after a full 
hearing on the merits). 
 69. Liddell, 469 F. Supp. at 1364–65. 
 70. Adams, 620 F.2d at 1291, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 949 (1980).  
 71. Adams, 620 F.2d at 1291–92. 
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on the north side of town and white parents on the south side of town. 
The meetings were regular, and some found them volatile. They 
ended, though, with newfound friendships among black and white 
parents who realized that they all just wanted a quality education for 
their children. Although it took time to get there, common ground 
was found, and the members of the committee celebrated this 
recognition by joining hands around a large conference table, black 
and white together, and singing ―We Shall Overcome.‖72  
As it turned out, however, citywide busing simply did not go over 
well. Aside from the fact that white student enrollment fell by the 
thousands between the 1971–72 school year and the 1978–79 school 
year, many white parents simply continued their hostility to efforts to 
integrate the city schools.
73
 So many white families ran away from 
public schools during this time that even the Catholic and Lutheran 
schools in the city were forced to halt ―the admission of public school 
students who were trying to avoid desegregation.‖74 People could still 
move out of St. Louis, of course, and they did so, leaving fewer and 
fewer whites remaining and making integration within the district 
more and more difficult. The Liddell lawsuit was still active, and both 
the NAACP and the Board of Education for the City of St. Louis 
continued their pressure for inter-district relief. The district court 
judge warmed to this idea, and a court order in June of 1980 proved 
instrumental in laying the framework for an inter-district 
desegregation plan. The court‘s order included remedies for 
voluntary inter-district busing, diversity training, curriculum 
improvements, community relations, and the integration of school 
teachers. It also ordered the State and the Board of Education to make 
every effort to work with the suburban districts to create a voluntary 
desegregation program between the districts for implementation by 
the 1980–81 school year, and it ordered these groups to submit a 
larger, more permanent plan for desegregation between the city and 
suburban districts.
75
 In an effort to assuage public concern, the 
 
 72. Singer, Mother on the March, supra note 1.  
 73. HEANEY & UCHITELLE, supra note 4, at 92–93. 
 74. Id. at 92. 
 75. Liddell v. Bd. of Educ., 491 F. Supp. 351, 353–54 (E.D. Mo. 1980). Although the 
district court‘s order was progressive and promising, it left over 30,000 black children in all-
black schools. This was the reason behind the district court‘s order to the defendants to look 
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district court judge immediately appointed an interracial citizens‘ 
advisory committee to provide public education and awareness 
surrounding the process.
76
 
A phenomenal account of the litigation has been told in the book: 
The Unending Struggle: The Long Road to an Equal Education in St. 
Louis.
77
 The first judge on the case, district court Judge Meredith, 
was forced to step down for health reasons after eight years of 
presiding over the case. He was replaced by district court judge 
William Hungate, who was on the federal bench less than a year 
before his assignment to the already famous Liddell case.
78
 By the 
time Judge Hungate was assigned to the case, the parties not only 
included the original parties to the lawsuit, but also the NAACP, the 
United States Department of Justice, the Board of Education of the 
City of St. Louis realigned as a plaintiff,
79
 the State of Missouri, 
dozens of suburban school districts, and the Special School District.
80
 
As the case continued to make its way through the system, a law 
school professor wrote an article in the local newspaper expressing 
frustration that the case was moving too slowly and boasting that he 
thought the case could be settled. The next thing this professor knew, 
Judge Hungate called him on the telephone, questioned him, and then 
said: ―so you think you can settle the case? I‘d like to see you try. I 
am appointing you as a Special Master on the case, effective 
immediately.‖81 That law professor, Washington University School of 
Law professor D. Bruce La Pierre, has written a detailed account of 
his experience as Special Master.
82
 The appointment of the Special 
 
more closely at inter-district involvement, voluntary or otherwise. This prompting ultimately 
became the basis of inter-district focus and its prominent role in the 1983 Settlement. La Pierre, 
supra note 68, at 975–87. 
 76. HEANEY & UCHITELLE, supra note 4, at 96. Then-Washington University School of 
Law Dean Edward T. Foote chaired this committee. Dr. Gary A. Orfield was the court-
appointed expert and was retained to provide advice in preparing a desegregation plan. Id. 
 77. HEANEY & UCHITELLE, supra note 4. 
 78. Id. at 107.  
 79. Id. at 991. 
 80. See, e.g., HEANEY & UCHITELLE, supra note 4; see also THE ST. LOUIS COMMUNITY 
MONITORING AND SUPPORT TASK FORCE 53 (unpublished 2009/2010 Annual Report To The 
Community) (on file with author) [hereinafter Annual Report]; La Pierre, supra note 68, at 990–
92. 
 81. Interview with D. Bruce La Pierre, in St. Louis, Mo. (Feb. 10, 2011). 
 82. La Pierre, supra note 68. 
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Master and the district judge‘s threats that he would consider a mass 
consolidation of the various school districts into one large 
metropolitan district with a uniform tax base if an inter-district 
violation were found (portending a remedy before a resolution of 
liability), signaled to all that the court was very serious about its 
hopes for a settlement. The threat of mass consolidation outraged the 
suburban school districts, the Attorney General of Missouri, and 
many members of the public.
83
 
Even with such a threat, though, hundreds of hours were logged 
by the Special Master attempting to settle the case.
84
 An agreement, a 
seventy-five-page, single-spaced document, was ultimately signed by 
the plaintiffs
85
 and the over twenty suburban school districts.
86
 The 
agreement, implemented in the 1983–84 school year,87 had three 
major components:
88
 (1) it provided for the voluntary inter-district 
transfer of 15,000 black students living in St. Louis City to suburban 
 
 83. Id. at 991–92; see also HEANEY & UCHITELLE, supra note 4, at 118. The district 
court‘s threats not only drew the ire of the suburban districts, but also that of Attorney General 
John Ashcroft, various state legislatures, and even resulted in death threats made against the 
judge. See, e.g., HEANEY & UCHITELLE, supra note 4, at 118–19.  
 84. Interview with D. Bruce La Pierre, supra note 81. See La Pierre, supra note 68, at 
995–1000, for a detailed explanation of the hundreds of hours of work invested by law 
professor D. Bruce La Pierre to turn the proposed settlement into a reality. 
 85. Two groups of plaintiffs, the City of St. Louis and the United States, did not sign the 
agreement. The district court noted that after being allowed to intervene in the case in 1977, the 
two plaintiffs not only declined ―to join in this effort to settle the case,‖ but also were ―reluctant 
either to litigate or to settle.‖ Liddell v. Bd. of Educ., 567 F. Supp. 1037, 1040–41 (E.D. Mo. 
1983), aff‘d as modified, 731 F.2d 1294 (8th Cir. 1983) (en banc), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 816 
(1984). 
 86. Liddell, 567 F. Supp. at 1040. The Eighth Circuit modified the original settlement 
agreement in several ways, the most important of which were as follows: (1) it limited transfers 
of black students from the city into the county to 15,000; (2) it denied the proposal that the 
State pay for county-to-county transfers; and (3) it denied the provision for State funding of 
county magnet schools. Liddell VII, 731 F.2d at 1309–12. The State of Missouri did not 
approve of the settlement. HEANEY & UCHITELLE, supra note 4, at 123. Despite its refusal to 
sign, the State was ordered to share in the costs of the intra-district transfer costs and to pay all 
of the inter-district transfer costs. See Liddell, 567 F. Supp. at 1055; HEANEY & UCHITELLE, 
supra note 4, at 125. After all was said and done, the State of Missouri would ultimately pay 
out approximately $2 billion, through the fiscal year 2010, in this desegregation case. See E-
mail from Robin Coffman, Chief of Staff, Mo. Comm‘r of Educ. Office, to author (May 23, 
2012, 11:41 A.M. CST) (on file with author) [hereinafter Coffman E-mail May 23]. 
 87. HEANEY & UCHITELLE, supra note 4, at 130; La Pierre, supra note 68, at 1013.  
 88. In addition to its major provisions, the agreement also established hiring goals for 
black teachers and administrators, created a voluntary teacher exchange program between the 
city and the county, and had elaborate finance provisions. La Pierre, supra note 68, at 1001. 
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schools;
89
 (2) it provided for the establishment and growth of magnet 
schools in the city;
90
 and (3) it envisioned quality education 
improvements and capital improvements for the estimated 10,000–
15,000 children who, even after transfers and magnet schools, would 
remain in segregated schools in the city.
91
 So, as it turned out, 
Professor La Pierre was correct. He was able to settle the case. And 
that settlement turned out to be the largest, most comprehensive, and 
most successful school-choice plan of its era.
92
 Four of the Liddell 
children were finished with public school by the time this settlement 
was penned. The Liddells‘ youngest child, Michael, was in 
elementary school.
93
 
Less than ten years after this historic settlement, the United States 
Supreme Court issued a series of opinions that began to rein in efforts 
 
 89. The agreement included plan ratios and goals for the transfer of black students into 
suburban schools. For example, suburban districts with low minority enrollments agreed to 
increase their percentages of black students to at least 15 percent beyond their current minority 
ratio up to a 25 percent maximum. The plan was capped so that minority students, resident and 
nonresident combined, would not make up more than 25 percent of student enrollment. 
HEANEY & UCHITELLE, supra note 4, at 123; La Pierre, supra note 68, at 1001. An organization 
known as the Voluntary Inter-district Coordinating Council was established to supervise the 
student transfers, among other things. La Pierre, supra note 68, at 1001. It was renamed the 
Voluntary Inter-district Choice Corporation (VICC) in 1999. For a history of VICC, see 
Historical Background, VOLUNTARY INTERDISTRICT CHOICE CORPORATION, http://www 
.choicecorp.org/HistBack.htm (last visited July 08, 2012). 
 90. Under the original terms of the agreement, magnet schools were to be racially 
balanced at 50 percent black, 50 percent white, with a 10 percent variance. La Pierre, supra 
note 68, at 1004. 
 91. Id. at 1005. See also Liddell VII, 731 F.2d at 1312–15. This third aspect of the 
settlement never operated as efficiently as was planned. Funding and goals likely were the 
problem. As the Special Master noted: there never was a ―generally accepted comprehensive 
description of the approved quality education component.‖ La Pierre, supra note 68, at 1030. 
This made assessment problematic. It took many years for the Board to comply with the court 
directives to reduce pupil/teacher ratios to twenty-four to one. The capital improvements 
aspects of the settlement were deemed by the Special Master to be ―a complete failure.‖ Id. at 
1032. The State‘s obligation, initially, was to match funds raised by the Board of Education 
through bond issues. However, the Board was never able to obtain voter approval. ―Although 
these bond issues have been supported by the predominately black north side, they have failed 
to garner adequate support on the predominately white south side.‖ Id. at 1033 (footnote 
omitted). Recall the deplorable conditions of the city schools in 1987. Id. The court eventually 
removed the matching limitation in place and required the State to pay now rather than later. It 
also found that the Board did not have to pass a bond. It would pay for improvements, over 
time, out of existing revenue. Id. at 1035. 
 92. HEANEY & UCHITELLE, supra note 4, at 129, 202; Craton Liddell‘s Legacy, supra 
note 57. 
 93. Singer, Mother on the March, supra note 1. 
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to desegregate schools.
94
 Specifically, in Oklahoma City Board of 
Education v. Dowell,
95
 the Court limited an earlier Supreme Court 
precedent. In Brown I, the Court held that ―[s]eparate educational 
facilities are inherently unequal.‖96 A dozen years later, and still 
holding steadfast to the legacy of Brown I, the Court, in Green v. 
County School Board of New Kent,
97
 clarified how far school districts 
needed to go to comply with Brown I. Green held that school boards 
were obligated to eliminate dual racial segregated education systems 
―root and branch.‖98 But the elimination of segregation at its root and 
at its branch was no longer the goal in 1991. Rather, Dowell allowed 
school districts to file motions declaring that they had done all they 
could to make the district a unitary one, even if the district was still, 
in fact, racially segregated.
99
 Good-faith efforts replaced complete 
elimination. Elimination of the vestiges of past discrimination to the 
extent practical was sufficient to satisfy the Constitution.
100
 Freeman 
v. Pitts,
101
 decided the next year, gave States the power to obtain 
relief from desegregation orders incrementally. In other words, 
declarations that dual and segregated areas of the system were 
 
 94. In 1974, the Supreme Court held, in Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 752 (1974), 
that it was constitutionally impermissible to impose an inter-district remedy for an intra-district 
violation in the absence of any claim or finding that all districts included within the district 
court‘s order engaged in unconstitutional behavior. This was a blow to the desegregation effort, 
since many urban areas were faced with declining white student enrollment and white flight to 
suburban areas. Looking To The Future Voluntary K–12 School Integration: A Manual For 
Parents, Educators, and Advocates 7 (2005), http://www.naacpldf.org/files/case_issue/ 
Voluntary_K-12_School_Integration_Manual.pdf [hereinafter Looking to the Future]. More 
devastating, many civil rights supporters argued, were back-to-back Supreme Court cases 
decided in the 1990s: Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991) and Freeman v. Pitts, 503 
U.S. 467 (1992). See Looking to the Future, supra, at 8; see also CHARLES J. OGLETREE, JR., 
ALL DELIBERATE SPEED: REFLECTIONS ON THE FIRST HALF-CENTURY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF 
EDUCATION 256–61 (2004).  
 95. 498 U.S. 237 (1991).  
 96. 347 U.S. at 495. One year later, Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 301 
(1955), found that school boards should admit students to public schools ―on a racially 
nondiscriminatory basis with all deliberate speed.‖  
 97. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).  
 98. Id. at 437–38 (emphasis added). 
 99. In explaining the difference between a unitary system and a dual one, Dowell stated: 
―Courts have used the terms ‗dual‘ to denote a school system which has engaged in intentional 
segregation of students by race, and ‗unitary‘ to describe a school system which has been 
brought into compliance with the command of the Constitution.‖ Dowell, 498 U.S. at 246. 
 100. Id. at 249–50. 
 101. 503 U.S. 467 (1992). 
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eliminated, eased or otherwise addressed, to the extent practical, 
could be sought even if other areas of the same system were still dual 
in nature.
102
 
Almost immediately after Dowell, the Attorney General of 
Missouri filed the first of what would eventually number three 
motions to have the SLPSD declared unitary.
103
 The filing of these 
and similar motions
104
 resulted in a three-week hearing.
105
 A finding 
 
 102. Specifically, the Court held as follows: 
 . . . in the course of supervising desegregation plans, federal courts have the authority 
to relinquish supervision and control of school districts in incremental stages, before 
full compliance has been achieved in every area of school operations. While retaining 
jurisdiction over the case, the court may determine that it will not order further 
remedies in areas where the school district is in compliance with the decree. That is to 
say, upon a finding that a school system subject to a court-supervised desegregation 
plan is in compliance in some but not all areas, the court in appropriate cases may 
return control to the school system in those areas where compliance has been achieved, 
limiting further judicial supervision to operations that are not yet in full compliance 
with the court decree. 
Id. at 490–91. 
 103. Liddell v. Bd. of Educ. (Liddell XXIX), 126 F.3d 1049, 1053 (8th Cir. 1997). The first 
motion was filed in October of 1991, a revised motion was filed in May of 1992, and a third 
motion was filed in November of 1993. A hearing was held in March of 1996. Id. at 1053–54. 
 104. There were other motions filed by the State to eliminate, terminate, or otherwise 
reduce its financial obligations under the 1983 Settlement Agreement. For example, in January 
of 1996, the State filed a motion to terminate the voluntary transfer of students as set forth in 
the 1983 Settlement. This motion relied heavily on a then-recent Supreme Court decision, 
Missouri v. Jenkins (Jenkins III), 515 U.S. 70 (1995). The district court in Kansas City found 
that the Kansas City School District did segregate children in public schools on the basis of 
race. Efforts to desegregate were nearly impossible given the racial composition of the Kansas 
City school district. The district court struggled to find ways to lure white children from 
suburban schools back to Kansas City for integration purposes. The court decided to turn the 
Kansas City School District into one big magnet school district in order to lure the white 
students from the suburbs into the city schools. This decision led to one of the most expensive 
and exhaustive efforts to make the Kansas City School District the best in the nation. The 
Supreme Court overturned this remedy as well beyond what was needed to remedy the intra-
district constitutional violation. Id. Justice O‘Connor, who concurred in the plurality opinion in 
Jenkins III, explained that the case stood for the proposition that a school district‘s 
constitutional violations did not transcend the geographical boundaries of the district. Thus, 
remedies could not include districts not alleged or proven to be constitutional violators. Id. at 
113. In Liddell, the district court denied the State‘s motion as premature. Fourteen months later, 
the State filed a near identical motion asking that all efforts to recruit and admit new students 
into the transfer program cease and desist pursuant to Jenkins III. The motion was again denied 
and affirmed on appeal. Liddell XXIX, 126 F.3d at 1054–58. Regarding Jenkins III, the Eighth 
Circuit stated as follows: 
A premise of Jenkins III was that the trial court specifically found that no inter-district 
violation had taken place. No such determination has been made here. To the contrary, 
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that unitary status had been reached in the SLPSD would have ended 
all efforts theretofore put in place to desegregate the public schools in 
St. Louis. Indeed, as Chief Justice Roberts would later say in Parents 
Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1,
106
 
once unitary status has been reached, the school district has 
―remedied the constitutional wrong that allowed race-based 
assignments.‖107 Given the movement of thousands of black children 
into suburban schools and white students into urban schools on a 
daily basis, it was very clear that a finding of unitary status would 
have resulted in complete resegregation the minute inter-district 
efforts ceased. To avoid this outcome, the district court judge 
appointed a ―Settlement Coordinator‖ to help facilitate a more 
fathomable conclusion to the quarter-century-old case.
108
 This 
coordinator, Dr. William Danforth, former Chancellor of Washington 
University in St. Louis, proceeded to shepherd a final resolution. He 
would later explain his role as follows: 
The first goal was to prevent disaster. Let‘s say, if the case had 
come to an end with no settlement agreement, the court had 
ended it, about twelve thousand kids would have come from 
the county to the city, the city would have had less money to 
take care of them than it had before they came, and no 
facilities. So the settlement basically continued the good 
programs instituted under the court order.
109
  
In addition to avoiding disaster, Chancellor Danforth sought 
independence from the court‘s supervision; he sought a settlement 
that would have finality;
110
 and he sought a settlement that would 
 
from the beginning the plaintiffs asserted inter-district violations. Rather than contest 
these allegations, the County District entered into a settlement agreement under which 
they agreed to accept a significant number of transfer students and in return were 
promised judgments relieving them from any possible constitutional violations.  
Id. at 1058 (emphasis added). 
 105. Liddell XXIX, 126 F.3d at 1054. 
 106. 551 U.S. 701 (2007). 
 107. Id. at 721. 
 108. Id.  
 109. HEANEY & UCHITELLE, supra note 4, at 193.  
 110. The agreement was projected to continue ―at least ten years from the effective date of 
the Agreement.‖ Agreement Among Participating School Districts 59 (1999) (unpublished 
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continue to allow voluntary participation in desegregation efforts and 
allow the State to phase out its funding obligations under the 1983 
Settlement.
111
 A new corporation also was to be formed to take the 
place of the court‘s supervision of the program.112 
By 1996–97, the health of the fifty-seven-year-old Minnie Liddell 
had taken an irreversible turn for the worse. No woman on her 
mother‘s side had ever lived past the age of forty, and some say that 
the family‘s history of bad health finally caught up to Mrs. Liddell. 
Although she survived diabetes and multiple surgeries in a short four-
year span, by 1996 she was suffering and attempting to recover from 
various ailments including appendicitis, a heart attack, a stroke, and 
multiple hospitalizations.
113
 Despite these health challenges and 
others, like the fact that the left side of her face was rendered 
immobile after her stroke, or that she lost control over her left eye as 
a result of damage to her optic nerve, or that sores on her feet made it 
almost impossible for her to stand, much less to walk,
114
 she still 
 
settlement agreement) (on file with author) [hereinafter 1999 Settlement Agreement]; see also 
HEANEY & UCHITELLE, supra note 4, at 199–200.  
 111. The State‘s financial obligation in the desegregation case was substantial. See, e.g., 
Coffman E-mail May 23, supra note 86. The fact that it fought and appealed virtually every 
decision in the case played a large part in the dollars ultimately spent on the case. See, e.g., 
HEANEY & UCHITELLE, supra note 4, at 200: 
[A]lthough the state obeyed every court order either before or after it exhausted its 
appeals to higher courts, it resisted every step of the way. The state filed numerous 
appeals to the United States Court of Appeals, and the parties petitioned the U.S. 
Supreme Court on five occasions. The state argued repeatedly that the court did not 
have the authority to order the state to fund the inter-district programs, and that the 
costs to the state were too high and without precedent. While complaining about the 
high costs of the desegregation program, the state spent over $8 million pursuing these 
legal actions. 
HEANEY & UCHITELLE, supra note 4, at 200 (footnotes omitted). 
 112. The ―New Entity,‖ as it was referred to in the 1999 Settlement Agreement, provided 
that this entity would ―receive, hold and disburse all funds pertaining to transfer students 
(including for transportation) generated under SB 781 (and enactments made therein) and all 
funds relating to the transfer program received pursuant to the 1999 Settlement Agreement or 
otherwise.‖ 1999 Settlement Agreement, supra note 110, at 56. The ―New Entity‖ was 
incorporated as the ―Voluntary Interdistrict Choice Corporation.‖ See Annual Report, supra 
note 80, at 60. 
 113. Singer, Mother on the March, supra note 1. Mr. Liddell, too, began to suffer from 
multiple sclerosis and leukemia. With Mrs. Liddell now immobile herself, her daughter moved 
in with her parents to help them out. Id.  
 114. Id. 
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found the strength to attend a hearing before various state legislators 
in 1997, with her son Craton. The meeting was of marathon length, 
and she did not get a chance to speak until after midnight. Although 
her words were slurred from her stroke, she made it clear that it was a 
sad day for her and for the children of St. Louis: 
I got out of my sickbed hoping I would hear something new 
and different, but I didn‘t. . . . I hear the state still trying to 
deny their guilt in perpetuating segregation in 100-and-some 
years in the state of Missouri, mandated by law. . . . We are 
asking for the same thing today, 25 years later, as we were 
asking in 1972: that is a quality, integrated education. 
Everyone wants to know whether integration works. Well, I 
can tell you what don‘t work—segregated education didn‘t 
work. It didn‘t work for me and it didn‘t work for a lot of black 
people. You owe it to the children of St. Louis to provide them 
some choices and a quality education. And if you don‘t see that 
happens, all of us are going to pay for it. Each and every one of 
us is going to pay for it.
115
 
 Despite her plea and her twenty-five-year battle, the end was 
neither smooth nor easy. Settlement took a few more years to mature; 
it involved intense politics; it required action by the state 
legislature;
116
 it required acceptance by the state‘s governor; it 
required voter approval of a sales tax; it required the approval of the 
plaintiffs; it required the approval of over twenty-five defendants; 
 
 115. Editorial, Minnie Liddell‘s Legacy, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 1, 2004, at C10. 
 116. The ―SB 781 was passed as one component of settling a long-running federal 
desegregation lawsuit regarding the City of St. Louis public schools.‖ Bd. of Educ. v. Mo. State 
Bd. of Educ., 271 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Mo. 2008). This landmark legislation provided, among other 
things, for: 
approximately $40m per year in state funds for the St. Louis city schools in the 
condition that (1) on or before March 15, 1999, the state attorney general notify the 
revisor of statutes that a ―final judgment‖ had been entered in this case as to the State 
and its officials, and (2) the voters of the City of St. Louis pass a sales or property tax 
which would generate approximately $20m per year for the public schools.  
Liddell v. Bd. of Educ., No. 4:72CV100 SNL, 1999 WL 33314210, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 12, 
1999) (Memorandum and Order Approving Settlement Agreement).  
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and it required the approval of the federal judge who then presided 
over the case.
117
 
Fortunately, however, Minnie Liddell lived to see the final 
settlement of the case. Health struggles continued to take their toll, 
but she was able to attend the final hearing on the case. The 
Honorable Stephen N. Limbaugh, Sr., who presided over the fairness 
hearing, fondly remembered Minnie Liddell, making her way slowly 
to the stand to testify.
118
 By this time, in 1999, Mrs. Liddell‘s 
youngest child, Michael, had already graduated from high school.
119
 
Although Michael benefited from the long-standing lawsuit and was 
a successful graduate of the public school system, Mrs. Liddell still 
testified and shared her story about her long journey for quality 
education. She could have easily stayed home, but she did not. This 
was a true testament to what she had said all along: she was not just 
in this for her kids. She cared about the education of all children in 
St. Louis. As her son said at the March 2012 conference at 
Washington University School of Law in his mother‘s honor: ―It 
wasn‘t just about [the Liddell] family. It was about kids who hadn‘t 
even been born yet.‖120 After recounting her then almost thirty-year 
battle to obtain quality education for the children of St. Louis, Minnie 
Liddell ultimately gave her blessing to the settlement. Although the 
State ―fought desegregation every step of the way,‖121 starting with 
Attorney General John Ashcroft and continuing with then-Attorney 
 
 117. See generally HEANEY & UCHITELLE, supra note 4, at 193–201. Judge Limbaugh 
stated that after giving her blessing to the settlement, Minnie Liddell reminded the judge that he 
had another interest in settling the case: ―Judge, I have survived every judge who has presided 
over this case but you. The odds are not in your favor.‖ Interview with Stephen N. Limbaugh, 
Sr., Judge, in St. Louis, Mo. (Feb. 17, 2012) [hereinafter Limbaugh Interview].  
 118. Limbaugh Interview, supra note 117. 
 119. Michael graduated from a magnet school, Central Visual and Performing Arts High 
School, in 1994. E-mail from Michael Liddell, to author (Oct. 1, 2012, 17:04 CST) (on file with 
author). 
 120. Dale Singer, Education Trends Could Jeopardize Gains Won by Liddell Case, 
Speakers Say, ST. LOUIS BEACON (Mar. 23, 2012), https://www.stlbeacon.org/#!/content/23595/ 
wash_u_ symposium_on_liddell_case. 
 121. Interview with D. Bruce La Pierre, supra note 81; Robert Joiner, For Susan Uchitelle, 
A Quality Education For All Children Is Always Worth Fighting For, ST. LOUIS BEACON (Sept. 
21, 2009), https://www.stlbeacon.org/#!/content/20695/for_susan_uchitelle_quality_education 
_for_ all_children_is_always_worth_fighting_for; HEANEY & UCHITELLE, supra note 4, at 186, 
188, 193. 
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General Jay Nixon,
122
 it was at this hearing that, for the first time in 
the history of the case, Mrs. Liddell heard an apology from the State 
for having supported segregated schools.
123
 The Liddell children have 
always believed that the litigation caused their mother‘s life to take 
an irreversible turn for the worse. They express some joy, though, 
from the fact that she lived to hear the State admit that it was 
wrong.
124
 The 1999 Settlement provided some closure to the decades-
old litigation. The closure was viewed by some as a positive step, but 
others, including the Special Master of the 1983 Settlement, viewed 
this closure as an abandonment of the commitment to 
desegregation.
125
 
Unlike the 1983 Settlement Agreement, the 1999 Settlement 
Agreement had a termination date. It was set to expire at the end of 
the 2008–09 school year. And, in fact, it did. That was the last year of 
the State‘s financial obligation under the settlement.126 The 1999 
 
 122. See, e.g., Liddell v. Bd. of Educ., 126 F.3d 1049, 1053–56 (8th Cir. 1997). 
 123. Then-Attorney General Jay Nixon apologized on behalf of the State. Limbaugh 
Interview, supra note 117; see also HEANEY & UCHITELLE, supra note 4, at 184. 
 124. Liddell Interview, supra note 44. 
 125. One who voted favorably for the sales tax increase necessary to replace some of the 
state dollars lost under the 1999 Settlement Agreement was quoted as saying the following: ―I 
voted yes, but I vote incredibly sadly. It‘s a poor solution to a complex problem. The end of 
desegregation is very sad.‖ Dale Singer, City Voters Support Tax Hike to End Desegregation, 
ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 3, 1999, at A1. The Special Master of the 1983 Settlement also 
was not happy with the 1999 Settlement. In an interview a few years after the settlement, 
Professor La Pierre remarked as follows, ―[after the settlement,] they had a party in the Chase 
Park Plaza to celebrate, and I thought the party was wildly inappropriate, because what we were 
celebrating was abandoning our commitment rather than staying with the commitment.‖ 
HEANEY & UCHITELLE, supra note 4, at 202. 
 126. E-mail from Robin Coffman, Chief of Staff, Mo. Comm‘r of Educ. Office, to author 
(May 31, 2012, 14:41 CST) (on file with author) [hereinafter Coffman E-mail May 31]. The 
state continues to pay a flat $7,000 for every black student from St. Louis city that transfers to a 
participating suburban district. Interview with Kelvin Adams, Superintendent, St. Louis Public 
School District, in St. Louis, Mo. (May 31, 2012) [hereinafter Adams Interview]; see also E-
mail from David Glaser, Chief Executive Officer, VICC, to author (July 3, 2012, 11:38 CST) 
(on file with author). Of course, under state law, the state is already obligated to pay SLPSD 
monies per pupil, for every child who attends the SLPSD. See MO. REV. STAT. § 163.031 
(2011). Instead of sending that money to the SLPSD, it sends it to the district where the child is 
attending. There are over five hundred districts in the state of Missouri. The per pupil cost to 
educate a child ranges vastly from as low as $4,731.83 in the Hope Academy District in Kansas 
City to a high of $32,224.33 in DeLaSalle Charter School. See School Finance; Current 
Expenditure per ADA for FY2011, MO. DEP‘T OF ELEMENTARY & SECONDARY EDUC. (June 18, 
2012, 3:00 PM), http://mcds.dese.mo.gov/quickfacts/Pages/District-and-School-Information 
.aspx. In the metropolitan St. Louis area, there are twenty-five school districts. The highest per 
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Settlement Agreement did include a separate agreement entered into 
by participating school districts allowing for an extension of the ten-
year maximum.
127
 An extension was entered into in July 2007, which 
extended the voluntary participation to the 2013–14 school year.128 
 
pupil cost within that group is $154,184.14, from the Special School District. Id. The next 
highest within that group is $18,065.88 from the Clayton School District, and the lowest is 
$8,439.71 from the Bayless school district. Id. Under the 1999 Settlement Agreement, however, 
participating suburban districts, with otherwise empty seats, agreed to accept the $7,000 and fill 
the seat with a VICC transfer student. Adams Interview, supra.  
 127. Paragraph 8 of the 1999 Settlement Agreement provides as follows: ―[t]here shall be a 
ten-year maximum on the acceptance of new transfers from either the City or the County, which 
maximum may be extended or modified by the New Entity as permitted by law.‖ 1999 
Settlement Agreement, supra note 110, at 59. Paragraph 2 of the 1999 Settlement Agreement 
defines the ―New Entity‖ as follows: 
On or before July 1, 1999 the Participating Districts shall, pursuant to the ―subject to‖ 
provision in the last sentence of R.S.Mo. § 162.1060.2(1), establish a New Entity 
(whether a new not-for-profit corporation, unincorporated association or other) which 
shall receive, hold and disburse all funds pertaining to transfer students (including for 
transportation) generated under SB 781 (and enactments made therein) and all funds 
relating to the transfer program received pursuant to the 1999 Settlement Agreement or 
otherwise. The New Entity shall operate the transfer program provided for herein and 
do all things incident thereto. Governance, representation and ―weighted‖ voting for 
the New Entity shall be as described for the statutory corporation in the last two 
sentences of R.S.Mo. § 162.1060.1, albeit the statutory corporation will not be used by 
the Participating Districts. All Participating Districts shall be members of or otherwise 
participate in the New Entity, but in no event will the weighted voting count any 
student more than once. 
Id. at 56. VICC was created as the New Entity and was incorporated as a non-profit 
organization in June of 1999. 
 128. See Frequently Asked Questions, VOLUNTARY INTERDISTRICT CHOICE CORPORATION, 
www.choicecorp.org/FAQ.pdf (last visited July 08, 2012). Although the ten-year period was set 
to expire at the end of the 2008–09 school year, VICC, pursuant to its authority under 
Paragraph 8 of the 1999 Settlement Agreement, extended acceptance of new transfer students 
through the 2013–14 school year. Id. It is anticipated that another extension will occur 
sometime at the end of 2012. E-mail from David Glaser, Chief Executive Officer, VICC, to 
author (Feb. 21, 2012, 11:00 CST) (on file with author) [hereinafter Glaser E-mail Feb. 21]. 
Although another extension may indeed occur, the program has dwindled to a shell of its former 
self. At its highest point, it transferred 13,493 black children from the city into the county and 
1,449 white children from the county into the city. Id. The figures for the 2010–11 school year 
show that 5,882 black children transferred from the city into the county, and 142 white children 
transferred from the county into city magnet schools. Id. According to the latest figures, 500 
children graduated out of the program and 700 new children were newly admitted. 
Consequently, a net loss of 100 spaces occurred in 2011–12. Id. For data on all transfers from 
1981 (when the program was only intra-district in nature) through the 2011–12 school year 
(including the inter-district transfers), see Glaser E-mail Feb. 21, supra.  
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Today, fourteen of the original twenty-four districts continue 
voluntary participation under the extension.
129
 
In the twenty-seven-year span of the lawsuit, it would be heard by 
four different district court judges: Chief Judge of the Eastern District 
of Missouri James Meredith, 1972–80; District Court Judge William 
Hungate, 1980–85; District Court Judge Stephen N. Limbaugh, Sr., 
1985–91 and 1998–2005; and District Court Judge George F. Gunn, 
Jr., 1991–98. All of the judges, with the exception of Judge Stephen 
N. Limbaugh, Sr., who is currently a practitioner at a major law firm 
in St. Louis, would both predecease the closure of the case and 
Minnie Liddell.
130
 
II. A LOOK AT WHERE QUALITY EDUCATION STANDS TODAY IN 
ST. LOUIS 
Of course, by 1999, the children in whose names the Liddell 
lawsuit was filed were out of the public school system. Michael 
Liddell, Minnie and Charles‘ youngest child, graduated from high 
school in 1994.
131
 For almost thirty years Minnie Liddell was the 
desegregation movement in St. Louis. She started the grassroots 
movement to change the public school system in St. Louis, she led 
the Concerned Parents group, and she became the lead plaintiff on the 
case. Once that lawsuit was filed, and for its entire twenty-seven-year 
lifespan, it was Minnie who attended virtually every deposition, 
every hearing—court, legislative, or otherwise—and she attended the 
trial. She was the one who was interviewed, appeared on television, 
testified before legislators, sat on panels, and sat on committees. 
 
 129. Today the following school districts participate in the voluntary transfer program: 
Affton, Bayless, Brentwood, Clayton, Hancock, Kirkwood, Lindbergh, Mehlville, Parkway, 
Pattonville, Rockwood, Valley Park and Webster Groves and the Special School District (SSD). 
Ladue and Ritenour, former participants, recently stopped taking new students. Two other 
districts, Pattonville and Lindbergh, have indicated that they will no longer accept new transfer 
students after the students currently enrolled in the program graduate. See generally Voluntary 
Transfer Program Handbook; For City Families Transferring to County Schools; 2012–2013, 
VOLUNTARY INTERDISTRICT CHOICE CORPORATION, www.choicecorp.org/CICOhb.pdf (last 
visited Aug. 08, 2012) [hereinafter Transfer Handbook]. 
 130. See, e.g., La Pierre, supra note 68, at 971, 977 n.11; HEANEY & UCHITELLE, supra 
note 4, at 162–63, 201. 
 131. See supra note 119. 
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Described as a tireless warrior,
132
 she was respected by those whom 
she fought against. For example, the very lawyer assigned to 
represent the School Board at the time, Kenneth Brostron, recalled 
the first time he met Mrs. Liddell: ―[I] met Mrs. Liddell in 1982 at a 
midnight negotiating session. . . . She walked into the room, she 
looked me right in the eye and said, ‗Make sure that you do what‘s 
right.‘ And without missing a beat, I said, ‗Yes ma‘am.‘‖133 The 
School Board chairman, Donald Schafly, who did not appreciate 
what he believed to be Minnie‘s confrontational style, had this to say 
about Minnie Liddell‘s effect on his career-long tenure on the board: 
I had had confrontations with Minnie Liddell long before she 
filed her lawsuit. On numerous occasions, she had addressed 
the board—always with caustic criticism. I must admit that as 
a public critic in front of the usual board audience, she was 
effective. She was a large woman who moved slowly, with 
dignity and self-assurance, and voiced her criticism in a deep, 
rolling voice. 
Early in 1981, when I announced I was not going to run again 
for the board, Minnie, at a board meeting, summoned me with 
her usual imperious gesture. ―Dan,‖ she said, ―I want to talk to 
you.‖ I assumed, of course, that once again there was 
something we were doing to which she objected. To my 
astonishment, she seized me by the arm and said, with some 
intensity, ―Dan, you've got to run again. We need you.‖ It was 
perhaps the finest compliment I had received in my entire 
board service.
134
 
She also taught her own lawyers a thing or two about preparing 
witnesses. In the early 1990s, for example, when a new young lawyer 
was brought onto the plaintiffs‘ team to help the then-ailing William 
Russell, that new lawyer, William Douthit, had to prepare Minnie for 
 
 132. Shera Dalin, Spearheaded Lawsuit over Desegregation Liddell Suit Led to City-
County Transfer Plan, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 29, 2004, at A1. 
 133. Jake Wagman, Friends, Family, Even A Former Adversary Honor School Crusader, 
ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 3, 2004. 
 134. Dale Singer, Decision Raised Hope for Millions, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, May 4, 
2004, at A1. 
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a hearing. He was nervous and did not know exactly how to prepare 
Minnie for her testimony. Attorney Russell told him: ―Don‘t worry. 
Minnie will tell you what to do. You just listen to her.‖135 
From all accounts she was the most vocal and active participant in 
the litigation throughout its lifespan. But by the late 1990s, when 
Minnie and her husband began to suffer a series of health setbacks, 
they were forced to scale back all of their civic activities. As she 
admitted in 1997: ―I‘m not able to get out there and fight any more. 
It‘s going to take those young parents now who have the stamina, the 
physical fitness and the anger that‘s necessary to get out there and 
fight for their kids.‖136 Not long after that statement, a series of 
tragedies befell the Liddell family. Craton Liddell, the child in whose 
name the case was originally filed, died in 2002 at the young age of 
forty-three. While still dealing with the grief of losing her first child, 
Minnie‘s husband, Charles Liddell, Sr., died the very next year in 
2003. These losses and the stress on her health took their ultimate toll 
on her too, just a few months later. In 2004, at sixty-four years old, 
Minnie Liddell died in her sleep.
137
  
By the time of her demise, the SLPSD was in trouble.
138
 In 2007, 
less than ten years after the official end of the litigation and the 
signing of the historic inter-district settlement, the SLPSD was 
stripped of its accreditation.
139
 This Part will look briefly at the events 
leading to the SLPSD‘s loss of accreditation in 2007. It will also look 
at an option, born from the lapse in accreditation, which purported to 
provide children in the unaccredited SLPSD the opportunity to 
receive a quality education. Finally, it will consider the recent grant 
of provisional accreditation to the SLPSD and whether that newly 
bestowed status changes the reality for St. Louis public school 
students.  
 
 135. Interview with William Douthit, in St. Louis, Mo. (May 7, 2009). 
 136. Singer, Mother on the March, supra note 1. 
 137. Scholarship Will Honor Desegregation Pioneer Minnie Liddell Harris-Stowe Pays 
Tribute to Advocate for Black City Students, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 30, 2004, 
METRO section. 
 138. See Kim Bell, St. Louis Schools Getting Worse, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 5, 
2005, at 12. 
 139. Steve Giegerich, Amid Anger, Tears, State Takes Control, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, 
Mar. 23, 2007, at A1. 
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A. The Loss of Accreditation 
The State Board of Education sets out guidelines for the 
accreditation of public schools in Missouri.
140
 In order to be 
accredited in Missouri under standards as they existed in 2006–07 
(and still exist today),
141
 school districts must meet fourteen annual 
performance standards, or points. The fourteen standards are in the 
following areas: (1) Missouri Assessment Program (MAP) Grades 3–
5 Mathematics; (2) MAP Grades 3–5 Communication Arts; (3) MAP 
6–8 Mathematics; (4) MAP Grades 6–8 Communication Arts; 
(5) Mathematics Grades 10 Algebra I; (6) Communication Arts 
Grade 11 EOC English II; (7) ACT; (8) Advanced Courses; 
(9) Career Education Courses; (10) College Placement; (11) Career 
Education Placement; (12) Graduation Rate; (13) Attendance Rate; 
and (14) Subgroup Achievement.
142
  
Based on this fourteen point system, schools are either accredited 
(9–14 of the fourteen points), provisionally accredited (6–8 of the 
fourteen points), or unaccredited (0–5 of the fourteen points).143  
Although classified as an accredited district in the 1993–94 school 
year,
144
 SLPSD students were clearly suffering academically a few 
short years later. Indeed, even in 1996 as then-Washington University 
Chancellor William Danforth was being selected as the Settlement 
 
 140. See What Happens When A School Becomes Unaccredited?, MO. DEP‘T OF 
ELEMENTARY & SECONDARY EDUC. (May 2012), http://dese.mo.gov/divimprove/sia/msip/ 
documents/unaccreditedschool.pdf. 
 141. E-mail from Robin Coffman, Chief of Staff, Mo. Comm‘r of Educ. Office, to author 
(Oct. 9, 2012, 10:56 CST) (on file with author). 
 142. For a detailed listing and explanation of these fourteen standards, see Understanding 
Your Annual Performance Report (APR), MO. DEP‘T OF ELEMENTARY & SECONDARY EDUC. 
(July 19, 2012), http://dese.mo.gov/divimprove/sia/dar/documents/understanding-your-apr-
2012-2013.pdf. See also Adams Testimony, infra note 157, at 441–43. 
 143. See 2012 School District Performance and Accreditation: A presentation to the State 
Board of Education, MO. DEP‘T OF ELEMENTARY & SECONDARY EDUC. 109 (Sept. 18, 2012), 
http://dese.mo.gov/stateboard/meetings/September/documents/ClassificationofSchools.pdf; see 
also What Happens When A School Becomes Unaccredited?, MO. DEP‘T OF ELEMENTARY & 
SECONDARY EDUC. (May 2012), http://dese.mo.gov/divimprove/sia/msip/documents/unaccred 
itedschool.pdf.  
 144. E-mail from Robin Coffman, Chief of Staff, Mo. Comm‘r of Educ. Office, to author 
(Oct. 4, 2012, 14:43 CST) (on file with author) (attaching St. Louis Public School Performance 
and Accreditation: State Board of Education Meeting, Mar. 22, 2007, at 2) [hereinafter 
Attachment to Coffman E-mail Oct. 4]. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol40/iss1/2
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Coordinator for the final settlement of the Liddell case, he observed 
that ―if you were a ninth-grade male in a non-magnet school in the 
city, in one of the city high schools . . . the chances of your 
graduating from the St. Louis public schools were under 15 
percent.‖145 By the time the 1999 Agreement was being inked, the 
Commissioner of the Department of Elementary and Secondary 
Education stated that the SLPSD was hanging on to accreditation ―by 
its fingertips.‖146 In actuality, hanging on by its fingertips was not 
only overly generous but also technically untrue. In the 1998–99 
school year, the SLPSD actually did qualify for unaccredited 
status.
147
 The 1999 Settlement Agreement, however, contained a 
provision requiring the postponement of unaccreditation in order to 
allow the City time to work on deficiencies within the district.
148
 And 
it further provided that ―[i]n no event will the State Board declare the 
St. Louis Public Schools to be unaccredited at any time prior to the 
end of the 2001–02 school year.‖149 Although the State Board was in 
possession of evidence establishing that the SLPSD should be 
reduced to unaccredited status, the Board complied with the 
Settlement mandate by tabling the vote on accreditation until 2002.
150
 
By the 1999–2000 academic year, the district was labeled 
provisionally accredited, and it retained that status until the 2004–05 
school year.
151
 By 2005–06, however, the district, once again, 
qualified for unaccreditation.
152
 The district was spiraling 
downward.
153
 The State Board finally recommended to the Missouri 
 
 145. See HEANEY & UCHITELLE, supra note 4, at 193. 
 146. School Officials Hope for Partial Accreditation, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Sept. 14, 
2000. 
 147. Attachment to Coffman E-mail Oct 4, supra note 144, at 2. 
 148. 1999 Settlement Agreement, supra note 110, at 20–21. 
 149. Id. at 22. 
 150. Attachment to Coffman E-mail Oct. 4, supra note 144, at 2. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 3. 
 153. Bell, supra note 138 (―If the district had to undergo accreditation review this year, it 
would drop to unaccredited status.‖). See also Public Education and Black Male Students: A 
State Report Card, SCHOTT FOUNDATION FOR PUBLIC EDUCATION 37 (2d ed. 2005), available 
at http://www.schottfoundation.org/drupal/publications/State%20Report%20Card%202nd%20 
editi.pdf (in the 2001–02 school year, nearly 75 percent of black males in St. Louis Public 
Schools did not graduate from high school with their cohorts). An increase from 29 percent 
graduation levels in the 2001–02 school year to 33 percent in the 2009–10 school year is 
certainly a trajectory in the right direction, but it is still woefully low. See The Urgency of Now: 
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Department of Elementary and Secondary Education (DESE) ―that 
the St. Louis public school district should be unaccredited.‖154  
A mere eight years after the 1999 Settlement Agreement became 
effective, the SLPSD lost its accreditation,
155
 the SLPSD‘s ―elected 
school board was stripped of its power, and a three-member ‗Special 
Administrative Board‘ was established.‖156 The loss of accreditation 
and takeover were attributed to three factors: unstable leadership, 
financial problems, and underperforming students.
157
 Before the 
takeover, the SLPSD had ―frequent turnover and infighting on the 
elected school board[,]
158
 . . . an unnervingly short term for 
 
The Schott 50 State Report on Public Education and Black Males, SCHOTT FOUNDATION FOR 
PUBLIC EDUCATION 25 (2012), available at http://www.schottfoundation.org/urgency-of-now 
.pdf [hereinafter Urgency Now]. 
 154. Bd. of Educ. v. Mo. State Bd. of Educ., 271 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Mo. 2008). 
 155. Id. at 5; see also Missouri Comprehensive Data System, MO. DEP‘T OF ELEMENTARY 
& SECONDARY EDUC. (June 19, 2012, 10:47 AM), http://mcds.dese.mo.gov/quickfacts/Site 
Pages/DistrictInfo.aspx?ID=bk8100030093006300130003002300. 
 156. Sylvia Maria Gross, Lessons from the Takeover of St. Louis Public Schools, KANSAS 
CITY PUBLIC MEDIA, Nov. 7, 2011, available at http://www.kcur.org/post/lessons-takeover-st-
louis-public-schools. Each Special Administrative Board Member is appointed—one by the 
governor, one by the mayor of St. Louis, and the third by the president of the St. Louis Board of 
Aldermen. The members have three-year terms. Although their term expired in 2010, the 
Missouri State Board of Education recently extended their oversight to June 30, 2014. See 
Editorial, Good Governance Our View: Debate on St. Louis Public Schools Oversight Should 
Begin Now, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 21, 2011, at A16; Andrew Fowler, Continuity is 
SLPS: DESE Recommends SAB Continue Governing For At Least 3 Years, ST. LOUIS AM., Dec. 
2–8, 2010, at A1. 
 157. Dale Singer, St. Louis Schools Cite Progress Toward Accreditation, ST. LOUIS 
BEACON (July 1, 2012), https://www.stlbeacon.org/#!/content/14242/st_louis_schools_cite_ 
progress_toward_accreditation [hereinafter Singer, Accreditation Progress]. See also Adams, 
Test. Tr. 440, Mar. 7, 2012 [hereinafter Adams Testimony]. 
 158. The recent history of the St. Louis Public School Board has been both dysfunctional 
and shameful. This history includes outright fistfights, highly questionable spending, profanity-
laced public tirades and personal conduct by various board members, and even the commitment 
to a mental facility of one board member. For a sense of the chaos that publicly played out on 
televisions and in newspapers from 2001 until the SAB took over, see Jake Wagman, School 
Board Member Says He May Kill Himself, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 26, 2005, at B02; 
Jake Wagman, Arrests, E-Mails Continue Seven-Seat Circus, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 
12, 2003, at B5; Jake Wagman, 4 Are Arrested at City School Board Meeting; Former Vashon 
Security Guard Jumped on Table, Sparking Scuffle, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 8, 2003, at 
D2; Jake Wagman, Aldermen Also Ask If School Contract Was Rushed; District‘s Board 
Selected NY Turnaround Firm For $5 Million Project; Review of Bids Took 11 Days, ST. LOUIS 
POST-DISPATCH, June 9, 2003, at B1; Jake Wagman, Member of St. Louis School Board Was 
Committed for Mental Illness; Involuntary Treatment Was Part of Conspiracy, She Says, ST. 
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, May 6, 2003, at A1; Rick Pierce, Ex-School Board Member Gets 
Consulting Contract; Strategic Vision President Says She Was Approached to Train School 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol40/iss1/2
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superintendents,‖159 as well as a ―negative fund balance of $12.4 
million in 2007–08.‖160 In regards to student achievement, the DESE 
Annual Performance Report indicated that the SLPSD met four of the 
fourteen Missouri School Improvement Standards in 2005–06.161 
Four dropped to two in 2007.
162
 In addition to ―financial problems 
and administrative instability,‖163 and the possession of a mere two of 
fourteen points towards accreditation, consider also:
164
  
1—In 2006 only 84.3 percent of the SLPSD teachers were 
certified,
165
 as compared to 96.7 percent for the State of 
 
Principals; Bids Are Not Required For Work, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 6, 2001, at C3; 
Rick Pierce, School Board Shows Signs of Splintering, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Sept. 9, 
2001, at B4; Rick Pierce, St. Louis School Board Paid $79,000 For Trips In Past Year; That is 
Double The Amount In Budget For Travel; Hammonds Promises Change, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, July 6, 2001, at B1; Amy Hilgemann, Editorial, Do City Schools Measure Up?: 
Money Goes into the Wrong Hands, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, June 7, 2001, at B7; Rick 
Pierce, 2 New Members Help Broaden Rift on St. Louis School Board; They Criticize 
Operations, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, June 6, 2001, at B1. 
 159. Singer, Accreditation Progress, supra note 157. The turnover of St. Louis Public 
School superintendents alone is telling. In the five-year period before current Superintendent 
Kelvin Adams was hired, the SLPSD had six different superintendents. See Malcolm Gay, State 
Takes Control of Troubled Public Schools in St. Louis, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2007, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/23/us/23missouri.html. 
 160. See Singer, Accreditation Progress, supra note 157. 
 161. Attachment to Coffman E-mail Oct. 4, supra note 144, at 2; see also Final 2006 
District Summary of Annual Performance Report (APR) 4th Cycle, MO. DEP‘T OF ELEMENTARY 
& SECONDARY EDUC. (Mar. 5, 2007), http://dese.mo.gov/planning/profile/apr/2006s115115 
.html [hereinafter 2006 SLPSD APR]. 
 162. Final District Summary of Annual Performance Report (APR) 4th Cycle, MO. DEP‘T 
OF ELEMENTARY & SECONDARY EDUC. (Dec. 14, 2007), http://dese.mo.gov/planning/profile/ 
apr/2007s115115.html [hereinafter 2007 SLPSD APR]. 
 163. St. Louis Loses Accreditation, MO. STATE TEACHERS ASS‘N (Mar. 22, 2007), 
http://www.msta.org/news/?ID=1363. 
 164. The following data has been taken from Kelvin R. Adams, District Data Profile St. 
Louis Public Schools, ST. LOUIS PUBLIC SCHOOLS (2009), http://www.slps.org/cms/lib03/MO0 
1001157/Centricity/Domain/13/DistrictDataProfile2009-2010wMSIPstandards.doc [hereinafter 
St. Louis District Profile]. 
 165. St. Louis District Profile, supra note 164. The Missouri Department of Elementary 
and Secondary Education (DESE) defines Certification Status of Teachers as: 
The percentage of teachers in the district who have regular teaching certificates; 
temporary authorization or special assignment certificates; and those with substitute, 
expired or no certificates. As required by federal law, the percentage of all classes 
taught by ―highly qualified teachers‖ is reported. A highly qualified teacher is one 
who: has at least a bachelor‘s degree; has demonstrated content expertise by passing a 
state-approved test or has completed an academic major or coursework equivalent to a 
major; and who holds full certification for his or her current teaching assignment.  
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Missouri. 
2—ACT scores in 2006 were 16.3 for the SLPSD as opposed 
to 21.6 for the state. 
3—The graduation rate, according to SLPSD data, was 56.2 
percent for SLPSD graduates, as compared to 85.8 percent for 
the State of Missouri. 
4—Attendance rates totaled 88.7 percent for SLPSD children 
as compared to the state average of 94.1 percent in 2006. At 
the time, in order to meet adequate yearly progress standards in 
elementary and middle schools, the attendance rate had to be at 
the level of 93 percent or higher or show improvement from 
the past year.
166
  
5—Finally, students in the SLPSD had high discipline incident 
rates, equaling 6.3 percent in 2006, in contrast to the state 
average of 2.1 percent.
167
  
Things were bad. It should have come as no surprise, then, when the 
district was stripped of accreditation.  
 
Id. at 8. 
 166. Id. at 17. 
 167. Id. at 2. The Schott Foundation for Public Education has as its mission ―to develop 
and strengthen a broad-based and representative movement to achieve fully resourced, quality 
pre K–12 public education.‖ See SCHOTT FOUNDATION FOR PUBLIC EDUCATION, http://www. 
schottfoundation.org/about/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2012). The organization publishes reports 
every year on the status of black and Latino males in public schools vis-à-vis the performance 
of white non-Latino males in identical categories. The organization very recently started 
tracking discipline incidence data. The most up-to-date data they have is for the 2009–10 
academic year. See Urgency Now, supra note 153. Most shockingly, it ranks Missouri as fifth in 
the nation for the highest suspension rates for black students. See Urgency Now, supra note 
153, at 36. With respect to out-of-school suspensions for black boys in St. Louis, for example, 
the report states: 
The number of out-of-school suspensions given to Black male students in St. Louis 
was equivalent to 39% of the district‘s male, Black student population. The number of 
out-of-school suspensions given to Latino male students in the district was equivalent 
to 13% of that group‘s population. The number of out-of-school suspensions given to 
male White students in St. Louis was equivalent to 13% of the district‘s White, male, 
non-Latino enrollment in the 2009–10 school year, as reported to the Office of the 
Civil rights of the U.S. Department of Education. 
See The Urgency of Now: Missouri, SCHOTT FOUNDATION FOR PUBLIC EDUCATION 3–4 (2012), 
http://www.blackboysreport.org/states/missouri.pdf. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol40/iss1/2
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2012]  Minnie Liddell‘s Forty-Year Quest 37 
 
 
The statute created to facilitate the 1999 Settlement Agreement, 
known as SB 781, provided for this contingency.
168
 Specifically, the 
bill laid the foundations for an overlay district, known as the 
transitional school district (TSD), with its own transitional school 
board, known as the Special Administrative Board (SAB). The TSD 
replaced the SLPSD, and the SAB, in all substantial respects,
169
 
replaced the existing elected Board. The job of the SAB was to do 
what was necessary to regain accreditation for the district.
170
 The 
SAB continues to govern the SLPSD today, and in fact, was recently 
extended for an additional term.
171
 
B. Turner v. CSD 
It‘s wrong they‘re not obeying the Supreme Court. It‘s wrong 
they‘re not obeying the statute. It‘s wrong they‘re not 
providing a decent education for children in St. Louis.
172
 
If a school was ever rendered unaccredited in the state of 
Missouri, a Missouri statute provided that the children who resided in 
the school‘s district could either attend some other accredited school 
in the same district or attend an accredited school in an adjoining 
district.
173
 By its own terms, then, the statute only applies if and when 
 
 168. The SB 781 was signed into law by then-Governor Mel Carnahan on June 23, 1998. 
Bill Bell, Jr., Carnahan Signs Bill for Ending Desegregation Case, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, 
June 24, 1998, at 24. The legislation was codified at MO. REV. STAT. §§ 135.348, 160.011, 
-.526, -.538, -.540, -.542, 161.220, -.527, 162.081, -.571, -.581, -.601, -.621, -.626, -.935, 
-.1060, -.1100, 163.011, -.021, -.031, -.161, 165.011, -.016, -.122, 166.260, -.275, 168.221, 
-.231, 170.250, 178.930 -939 (1998). 
 169. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Mo. State Bd. of Educ., 271 S.W.3d 1, 18 (Mo. 2008) (the 
relevant statutory law in Missouri vests all powers of the elected school board in the SAB 
―except that the [elected] board retains the powers of audit and public reporting[.]‖). 
 170. See MO. REV. STAT. § 162.1100 (2000).  
 171. See supra note 156 for the details on the SAB extension. 
 172. Elisa Crouch, Whatever the Outcome, Clayton Tuition Lawsuit Has Hefty Tab, 
STLTODAY.COM (Mar. 13, 2011), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/education/whatever-the-
outcome-clayton-tuition-lawsuit-has-hefty-tab/article_0d21c09a-d430-5634-89d2-4a6e96e0b1 
79.html (quoting Dr. Jane Turner, lead plaintiff in the Turner case) [hereinafter Crouch, 
Whatever the Outcome]. 
 173. MO. REV. STAT. § 167.131 (2000). Section 167.131 was originally enacted in 1931. It 
was amended in 1993 and then made part of the Missouri Outstanding Schools Act. The 
original text of 1931, as well as the 1993 amendments are infra note 185. The Outstanding 
Schools Act was enacted to improve the quality of education for Missouri students. It included 
―provisions relating to reduction in class size, the A+ program, funding for parents as teachers 
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a given district is unaccredited. Under the statute, the transferor 
school district has no discretion as to whether to accept the student or 
not, and the unaccredited school (or district, as the case may be) must 
bear the financial cost of that transfer.
174
 
Once the SLPSD lost accreditation in 2007, a parent who lived in 
the SLPSD wrote the superintendent of one of the districts adjoining 
the SLPSD, the Clayton School District (CSD), and asked the CSD to 
start billing the SLPSD for her children‘s tuition. This parent, Dr. 
Jane Turner, was a former resident in the CSD community, and her 
children formerly attended school in that district. She subsequently 
married a St. Louis circuit court judge.
175
 St. Louis City judges must 
live in St. Louis, so Dr. Turner relocated to St. Louis City.
176
 She kept 
her children, however, in the CSD. Because her children attended 
public school in a district in which they did not reside, she had to pay 
non-resident tuition fees for her children to attend school.
177
 Once the 
SLPSD lost accreditation, Mrs. Turner sought confirmation from the 
CSD that it would look to the SLPSD for its tuition, pursuant to 
 
and early childhood development, teacher training, the upgrading of vocation and technical 
education, measures to promote accountability and other provisions.‖ MO. REV. STAT. 
§§ 160.500-.538, -.545, -.550, 161.099, -.610, 162.203, -.1010, 163.023, 166.275, -.300, 
170.254, 173.750, 178.585, -.698 (2012). The statute also contains several provisions 
addressing school funding, as well as amended tax rates and deductions. 
 174. MO. REV. STAT. § 167.131 (2000). 
 175. Interview with Elkin Kistner, Attorney for Plaintiffs, in Clayton, Mo. (June 21, 2012) 
[hereinafter Kistner Interview]. 
 176. Crouch, Whatever the Outcome, supra note 172.  
 177. MO. REV. STAT. § 167.151(1), entitled ―Admission of Nonresident and Other Tuition 
Pupils—Certain Pupils Exempt From Tuition—School Tax Credited Against Tuition—Owners 
of Agricultural Land in More Than One District, Opinions, Notice Required, When[:] 1. The 
school board of any district, in its discretion, may admit to the school pupils not entitled to free 
instruction and prescribe the tuition fee to be paid by them, except as provided in sections 
167.121 and 167.131.‖ Some districts in Missouri, like the Ladue school district for example, 
do not allow a non-resident to pay tuition to attend school in the district. See, e.g., Frequently 
Asked Questions, LADUE SCHOOLS, http://www.ladueschools.net/district/content/main/faqs 
.shtml (last visited Nov. 7, 2012). In order to determine the tuition amount applicable in a given 
district, one would need to visit the website for the particular district. In Clayton, the tuition 
amount varies depending on the grade the child is in. See, e.g., Tuition, SCHOOL DISTRICT OF 
CLAYTON, http://www.clayton.k12.mo.us/tuition (last visited Nov. 7, 2012). Districts base non-
resident tuition amounts on current expenditure amounts per average daily attendance. These 
amounts vary in Missouri by district. See generally School Finance Report, MO. DEP‘T OF 
ELEMENTARY & SECONDARY EDUC. (Nov. 4, 2012, 10:11 AM), http://mcds.dese.mo.gov/ 
guidedinquiry/District%20and%20School%20Information/School%20Finance%20Report.aspx 
[hereinafter School Finance Report]. 
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section 167.131.
178
 Despite precedent for such billings,
179
 the 
superintendent refused. Dr. Turner and three other similarly situated 
plaintiffs then filed suit in a St. Louis County Court against the CSD 
and the SLPSD, and its temporary successor, the TSD,
180
 seeking a 
declaration that the CSD had to seek payment not from them but from 
the unaccredited SLPSD pursuant to Missouri Statute Section 
167.131.
181
  
I will briefly describe how the Missouri courts have handled this 
litigation. Although filed in 2007, the litigation is currently before the 
Missouri Supreme Court for a second time. As will be discussed 
infra, the SLPSD recently was awarded with provisional 
accreditation, having obtained points within the 6–8 point range for 
provisional status.
182
 While it appears likely that no other St. Louis 
public school student will (or can) seek transfer under the statute at 
issue in Turner at this particular juncture, the statute is still worth 
discussing. There are several other unaccredited districts within the 
state of Missouri that undoubtedly have parents interested in the 
reach of section 167.131.
183
 Moreover, because of the potential 
damage the statute could have on St. Louis (and indeed, may still 
have on either St. Louis or other districts and cities within such 
districts) the effects, as proven at trial, of the damaging reach of 
section 167.131 on the district, on students, and on the St. Louis 
community should be told. And indeed, as advanced below, no matter 
how the issues in Turner are resolved in the courts, and despite the 
 
 178. Turner v. Sch. Dist. of Clayton, 318 S.W.3d 660, 663 (Mo. 2010). 
 179. Not only had the CSD billed the Wellston School District under section 167.131 for 
the thirteen Wellston students who transferred to the CSD after Wellston lost accreditation in 
2003, but another district in Missouri, the Wyaconda School District, also had to pay a nearby 
accredited district under section 167.131 to educate its students after it lost accreditation in 
2006. See Crouch, Whatever the Outcome, supra note 172. The Wyaconda School District then 
contained thirty-five students, considerably smaller than the SLPSD. See Coffman E-mail May 
31, supra note 126. 
 180. Throughout the remainder of this Article, the terms SLPSD and the TSD will be used 
interchangeably. Recall that the SLPSD is unaccredited, and an overlay district, the TSD, is 
currently acting on its behalf.  
 181. Turner, 318 S.W.3d 660 (Mo. 2010); see also Crouch, Whatever the Outcome, supra 
note 172; Paul Hamper, Parents Want City Schools To Pay Clayton Tuition, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, Nov. 15, 2007, at C1.  
 182. Recall the fourteen-point system used to determine a district‘s status as accredited, 
provisionally accredited, and unaccredited. See supra notes 142–43. 
 183. See, e.g., infra note 272.  
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provisional accreditation of the SLPSD, the central issue of this 
Article remains: has quality education been obtained for the children 
of St. Louis? 
Let‘s turn, for a moment, to the statute at the heart of Turner. The 
statute was originally enacted in 1931. The reproduction below 
demonstrates the changes between the 1931 version and the 1993 
version. The strikeouts represent the text removed, and the bolded 
text represents the language added in 1993: 
167.131. 1. The board of education of each district in this state 
that does not maintain an approved high school offering work 
through the twelfth grade accredited school pursuant to the 
authority of the state board of education to classify schools 
as established in section 161.092, RSMo, shall pay the tuition 
of and provide transportation consistent with the 
provisions of section 167.241,
184
 RSMo, for each pupil 
resident therein who has completed the work of the highest 
grade offered in the schools of the district and who attends an 
approved high accredited school in another district of the same 
or an adjoining county, or an approved high school maintained 
in connection with one of the state institutions of higher 
learning, where work of one or more higher grades is offered. 
2. The rate of tuition to be charged by the district attended and 
paid by the sending district is the per pupil cost of maintaining 
the high district’s grade level grouping which includes the 
school attended. The cost of maintaining a grade level 
 
 184. Section 167.241 deals with ―Transportation of Pupils to Another District.‖ It was 
modified as part of the 1993 Act. The strikeouts represent the text removed and the bolded text 
represents the language added in 1993:  
167.241. Transportation for pupils whose tuition the district of residence is required to 
pay by section 167.131 or who are assigned as provided in section 167.121 shall be 
provided by the district of residence; however, in the case of pupils covered by section 
167.131, the district of residence shall be required to provide transportation only to 
high schools school districts accredited meeting minimum classification standards 
adopted by the state board of education pursuant to the authority of the state board 
of education to classify schools as established in section 161.092, RSMo, and those 
high schools school districts designated by the board of education of the district of 
residence.  
1993 MO. LEGIS. SERV. 380 (West). 
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grouping the high school attended shall be determined by the 
board of education of the district but in no case shall it exceed 
all amounts spent for teachers' wages, incidental purposes, debt 
service, maintenance and replacements. The term ―debt 
service‖, as used in this section, means expenditures for the 
retirement of bonded indebtedness and expenditures for 
interest on bonded indebtedness. Per pupil cost of the grade 
level grouping school attended shall be determined by 
dividing the cost of maintaining the high school grade level 
grouping by the average daily high school pupil attendance. If 
there is disagreement as to the amount of tuition to be paid, the 
facts shall be submitted to the state board of education, and its 
decision in the matter shall be final. Subject to the limitations 
of this section, each pupil shall be free to attend the public 
school of his or her choice; but no school shall be required to 
admit any pupil.
185
 
Plaintiffs in Turner sought a declaration that section 167.131: 
(1) allows pupil residents in an unaccredited school district to attend 
an accredited school in the same or adjoining county; (2) mandates 
that the unaccredited district pay the tuition for that student to the 
receiving school; and (3) mandates that the receiving school admit 
any such student.
186
 The defendants, the CSD and the SLPSD, 
responded as follows: (1) that section 167.131 should only apply if a 
particular school is unaccredited but not if an entire district is 
unaccredited; (2) that because there were some accredited schools 
within the SLPSD the statute should not apply; (3) that the 1999 
settlement in the Liddell case and the corresponding legislation 
accompanying that settlement, SB 781, specifically governed the 
transfer of SLPSD children,
187
 and thus, since it was enacted after 
 
 185. Id.; 1931 MO. LAWS 343. 
 186. Turner, 318 S.W.3d at 663. 
 187. The SB 781, unlike section 167.131, is strictly limited to the transfer of black students 
out of the city and into county schools and white students out of the county into city magnet 
schools. The purpose of this statute was to aid in remedying unconstitutional racial segregation. 
Transferring white students out of the city and into the already predominately white suburban 
schools under section 167.131, would, then, according to the defendants, go against the purpose 
of the remedy enacted in SB 781. The funding schemes also differed. SB 781 was designed to 
provide more resources to city schools and created a special corporation designed to implement 
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1993, it should take precedence over the earlier enacted section 
167.131; and (4) that the Missouri Safe Schools Act, enacted in 1996, 
gave school districts discretion in admitting non-resident students to 
their schools.
188
 
 
and fund the program (―VICC‖), but if the provision in section 167.131 were followed, 
resources would be depleted from the city schools. Transportation of students under the two 
statutes also is dealt with differently. Under SB 781, VICC would provide transportation at no 
cost to the parent, or the city, but under section 167.131, the entire cost of transportation would 
be absorbed by the city. Memorandum in Support of Defendant School District of Clayton‘s 
Motion to Dismiss and for Summary Judgment at 5–6, Turner v. Clayton Sch. Dist., No. 07SL-
CC00605 (St. Louis Cnty. Ct. Jan. 22, 2008). Moreover, the CSD predicted that implementing 
section 167.131 would have another more direct effect on the transfers under SB 781: 
―participating St. Louis County school districts would be likely to discontinue participation in 
the program [under SB 781] to accommodate the increasing number of city students choosing to 
transfer to county schools under Section 167.131.‖ See id. at 8. Finally, the CSD argued that SB 
781 already provided for what was to happen if SLPSD ever became unaccredited. Section 
162.1100 provides for the SAB to assume obligations and take steps towards regaining 
accreditation. MO. REV. STAT. § 162.1100 (2000). The SAB cannot do its job if students and 
money are fleeing the district because of section 167.131. Turner, 318 S.W.3d at 667. 
 188. Turner, 318 S.W.3d at 665–67. The Missouri Safe Schools Act is codified at MO. 
REV. STAT. §§ 160.011–.457, 167.020–.627. It passed in 1996 after a student at a high school in 
Missouri was raped and killed by another student who had just transferred to the school only the 
day before. The attacker had transferred after being suspended from his home school. See 
Turner, 318 S.W.3d at 671 n.2 (Breckenridge, J., dissenting). Section 167.020 sets up three 
ways in which a child can attend a school in a given district. The child must: (1) be a resident in 
the school district; (2) request and receive a waiver of the residency requirement; or (3) fall into 
a small category of exemptions. Specifically, MO. REV. STAT. § 167.020 provides, in relevant 
part, as follows: 
2. In order to register a pupil, the parents or legal guardian of the pupil or the pupil 
himself or herself shall provide, at the time of registration, one of the following: 
(1) Proof of residency in the district . . .; or 
(2) Proof that the person registering the student has requested a waiver under 
subsection 3 of this section within the last forty-five days . . . . 
* * * 
6. Subsection 2 of this section shall not apply to a pupil who is a homeless child or 
youth, or a pupil attending a school not in the pupil's district of residence as a 
participant in an inter-district transfer program established under a court-ordered 
desegregation program, a pupil who is a ward of the state and has been placed in a 
residential care facility by state officials, a pupil who has been placed in a residential 
care facility due to a mental illness or developmental disability, a pupil attending a 
school pursuant to sections 167.121 and 167.151, a pupil placed in a residential 
facility by a juvenile court, a pupil with a disability identified under state eligibility 
criteria if the pupil is in the district for reasons other than accessing the district's 
educational program, or a pupil attending a regional or cooperative alternative 
education program or an alternative education program on a contractual basis. 
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The trial court ruled in the defendants‘ favor,189 and the plaintiffs 
appealed to the Missouri Court of Appeals.
190
 Because of the 
importance of the issue, the Court of Appeals transferred the case to 
the Missouri Supreme Court.
191
 The Missouri Supreme Court 
promptly reversed and remanded the case back to the trial court.
192
 
The Missouri Supreme Court found that the plaintiffs were bound by 
the enforceable tuition agreements they entered into and were not 
entitled to restitution for tuition paid.
193
 Going forward, however, the 
court also held that for any academic year in which the SLPSD 
remained unaccredited and for which no tuition agreement was in 
effect: section 167.131 applied to the SLPSD/TSD;
194
 it applied 
whether only one school in the district was unaccredited or the entire 
district was unaccredited;
195
 the statute did indeed give a child living 
in an unaccredited school district the exclusive right to transfer to an 
accredited school in the same or an adjoining county at the expense 
of the unaccredited;
196
 SB 781 did not conflict with section 
167.131;
197
 and the Missouri Safe Schools Act was not relevant in 
this particular case.
198
 This opinion sent shock waves around the 
state.
199
 
 
MO. REV. STAT. § 167.020 refers to two other Missouri statutory provisions: MO. REV. STAT. 
§ 167.121, which allows a student not living within a given school district the opportunity to 
attend that school district by entering into a tuition agreement with the receiving district; and 
MO. REV. STAT. § 167.151, which provides, among other things, that school districts have 
discretion in admitting students and also lays out the circumstances under which a district can 
and cannot charge tuition.  
 189. Turner v. Clayton Sch. Dist., No. 07SL-CC00605 (St. Louis Cnty. Ct. Oct. 23, 2008). 
 190. Turner v. Clayton Sch. Dist., No. ED92226, 2009 WL 1752140 (Mo. Ct. App. June 
23, 2009). The court found no contingency in the contract that would relieve the plaintiffs from 
paying the agreed upon amount. Moreover, the court said that ―logistically, the Transitional 
School board cannot be obligated to pay a tuition that Appellants are already contractually 
obligated to pay.‖ Id. at *4. 
 191. Turner v. Sch. Dist. of Clayton, 318 S.W.3d 660, 663 (Mo. 2010). 
 192. Turner, 318 S.W.3d at 663. 
 193. Id. at 669–70.  
 194. Id. at 665.  
 195. Id.  
 196. Id. at 664–65. 
 197. Id. at 665–66. 
 198. Id. at 668–69. Specifically, the court labeled the Safe Schools Act as a general statute 
and section 167.131 as a specific one, and the specific would govern over the general. Id. 
Moreover, the court found that because the language in section 167.131 is clear, there was 
simply no need to refer to another similar statute. Id. at 670. 
 199. Newspapers, letters to the editor, and blogs were all abuzz after the Turner decision 
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On remand and four years after the lawsuit was originally filed, 
taxpayers for both the city of St. Louis and the city of Clayton were 
allowed to intervene.
200
 As it turns out, this intervention was the only 
means for defendant school districts to raise constitutional concerns 
against the statute.
201
 Plaintiffs, though, vehemently opposed 
intervention at such a late date, and after the case had already gone up 
to the Missouri Supreme Court, but their opposition was to no 
avail.
202
 The case proceeded to trial with a focus on three issues: 
1) whether section 167.131 is a violation of the Hancock 
Amendment to the Missouri Constitution, 2) whether 
compliance with section 167.131 by the SLPSD and the CSD 
is impossible and 3) whether the sole remaining plaintiff owed 
the CSD tuition for the two and a half years the plaintiff‘s 
 
came down. The legislature spent two full legislative terms trying to change the court‘s opinion. 
For an example of the discussions between 2010 and 2012 surrounding the ramifications of 
Turner, see, e.g., Elisa Crouch, Call to Act on School Transfers, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, 
Jan. 12, 2012, at 4A [hereinafter Crouch, Call to Act]; Virginia Young, Debate Could Affect 
72,000 Students Here, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 24, 2011, at 2A. Several bills were 
subsequently introduced in the legislature. An example of the legislation considered by the 
respective houses is as follows: in the Senate, there was SB 14, sponsored by Senator David 
Pearce. This bill would have provided more local control to receiving districts. SB 369, 
sponsored by Senator Jane Cunningham, provided for more local control with receiving 
districts, created a scholarship program for students in accredited districts, and provided 
boundaries for where children from unaccredited districts could attend school. House 
Representative Tishaura Jones introduced HB 473. This bill, known as ―Reform Lite,‖ dealt 
primarily with statewide charter school expansion. HB 1740, sponsored by House 
Representative Scott Dieckhaus, provided for a passport scholarship program, providing grants 
to students residing in unaccredited districts that the students could use to attend other 
accredited schools. For an idea of the politics surrounding the Turner fix, see Virginia Young, 
Education Panel is Retooled for Reform, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 6, 2012, at A1; 
Virginia Young, Missouri Schools Face Influx of Students From Failing Districts, 
STLTODAY.COM (May 6, 2011), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/education/missouri-
schools-face-influx-of-students-from-failing-districts/article_0c01e977-27ff-5ae5-9c410a1724 
17ca44.html.  
 200. See Turner v. Clayton Sch. Dist., Nos., 12SL-CC00411, 07SL-CC00605, Order (St. 
Louis Cnty. Ct. July 22, 2011). 
 201. As is now clearly established in Missouri, only taxpayers, and not school districts, 
have standing to raise constitutional claims based on the Hancock Amendment to the state‘s 
constitution. King-Willmann v. Webster Groves Sch. Dist., 361 S.W.3d 414 (Mo. 2012). 
 202. See Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant Breitenfeld's Post-trial Brief at 8-9, Turner v. 
Clayton Sch. Dist., No. 12SL-CC00411 (St. Louis Cnty. Ct. Apr. 10, 2012) [hereinafter 
Plaintiff‘s Post-trial Brief]. 
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children attended schools in the CSD under tuition 
agreements.
203
 
Let me first briefly identify the Hancock Amendment concerns. At 
trial, defendants argued that section 167.131 violated a 1980 
amendment to the Missouri Constitution known as the Hancock 
Amendment.
204
 The Hancock Amendment provides, in part, that:  
[p]roperty taxes and other local taxes and state taxation and 
spending may not be increased above the limitations specified 
herein without direct voter approval as provided by this 
constitution. The state is prohibited from requiring any new or 
expanded activities by counties and other political subdivisions 
without full state financing, or from shifting the tax burden to 
counties and other political subdivisions.
205
 
The question before the trial judge in Turner was whether, by virtue 
of the post-1980 changes made to section 167.131,
206
 a new activity, 
expanded service, or increase was required, and if so, whether the 
State provided funding for such new activity, expanded service, or 
increase. 
The CSD and its taxpayers argued that requiring the CSD to build 
buildings and hire teachers was well in excess of its own taxing 
 
 203. Turner v. Clayton Sch. Dist., Nos. 12SL-CC00411, 07SL-CC00605, slip op. at 15–16 
(St. Louis Cnty. Ct. May 1, 2012). This Article will only briefly explore the first two arguments 
tried in the court.  
 204. See, e.g., Post-trial Brief of School District of Clayton and Its Taxpayers at 21, Turner 
v. Clayton Sch. Dist., No. 12SL-CC00411 (St. Louis Cnty. Ct. Apr. 10, 2012) [hereinafter 
Clayton‘s Post-Trial Brief]; see also Post-trial Brief of SLPS Parties Relating to Hancock 
Amendment Issues, Turner v. Clayton Sch. Dist., No. 12SL-CC00411 (St. Louis Cnty. Ct. Apr. 
10, 2012) [hereinafter SLPS Hancock Brief].  
 205. MO. CONST. art. X, § 16 (emphasis added). This italicized language is developed more 
fully in section 21 of the amendment. That section provides: 
The state is hereby prohibited from reducing the state financed proportion of the costs 
of any existing activity or service required of counties and other political subdivisions. 
A new activity or service or an increase in the level of any activity or service beyond 
that required by existing law shall not be required by the general assembly or any state 
agency of counties or other political subdivisions, unless a state appropriation is made 
and disbursed to pay the county or other political subdivision for any increased costs.  
MO. CONST. art. X, § 21. 
 206. See supra note 185 and accompanying text for the text of section 167.131 in both the 
1931 and 1993 versions. 
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power and was an unfunded mandate in violation of the Hancock 
Amendment.
207
 The SLPSD and its taxpayers argued that thousands 
of students, for whom it received no funding from the state,
208
 would 
be eligible to transfer at the total expense of the SLPSD.
209
 Both the 
plaintiff and the State of Missouri rebutted defense arguments that 
section 167.131 violated the Missouri Constitution. Both were united 
in their positions that providing education was not a new or expanded 
activity and thus did not trigger scrutiny under the state‘s 
constitution.
210
 
A second argument advanced at trial by the defendants was that 
compliance with section 167.131 would be impossible.
211
 Crucial to 
this argument was the testimony of a defense expert witness, Dr. 
Terrence Jones. Dr. Jones was hired to determine the number of 
school-age children residing in the SLPSD who might transfer to 
suburban schools if afforded the opportunity provided for under the 
statute. After determining, based on the 2005–09 American 
Community Survey conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau, that 
approximately 56,619 school-age children lived in the City of St. 
Louis, Dr. Jones then had a random telephone survey conducted. 
 
 207. See, e.g., Clayton‘s Post-Trial Brief, supra note 204, at 2. 
 208. See Banks, Test. Tr. 375–76, Mar. 6, 2012 [hereinafter Banks Testimony]. 
 209. See, e.g., Clayton‘s Post-Trial Brief, supra note 204; SLPS Hancock Brief, supra note 
204, at 10. Turner v. Clayton Sch. Dist., No. 12SL-CC00411 (St. Louis Cnty. Ct. Apr. 10, 
2012). See also Adams Testimony, supra note 157, at 453; Banks Testimony, supra note 208, at 
375. For more information on the Hancock Amendment, see generally Dale C. Doerhoff, 
Hancock Amendment Struggle Continues, 50 J. MO. B. 65 (1994); Ronald K. Rowe II, Beyond 
Equality and Adequacy: Equal Protection, Tax Assessments, and the Missouri Public School 
Funding Dilemma, 75 MO. L. REV. 1037 (2010). As Professor Colin Gordon has noted: 
Hancock limited growth in state taxes to the rate of growth in family income and 
prohibited new or increased local taxes without popular approval. This led to a greater 
reliance on local licenses and fees for service, and to a zero-sum logic that targeted the 
revenues from any new tax and matched it with relief from another tax—as in a small 
increase in the state sales tax (1982) whose proceeds were split between state aid to 
education and a property tax rollback. In effect, Hancock furthered the transformation 
of the property tax from a source of local revenue to a fiscal tool of the state.  
GORDON, supra note 22, at 56 (footnote omitted).  
 210. See Plaintiff‘s Post-trial Brief, supra note 202, at 9; State Defendants' Post-trial Brief 
at 6, Turner v. Clayton Sch. Dist., No. 12SL-CC00411 (St. Louis Cnty. Ct. Apr. 10, 2012) 
[hereinafter State Post-Trial Brief]. 
 211. Turner v. Clayton Sch. Dist., Nos. 12SL-CC00411, 07SL-CC00605, slip op. at 15–16 
(St. Louis Cnty. Ct. May 1, 2012).  
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Based on 601 completed interviews from that survey, he prepared a 
report of his conclusions.
212
 In his report, Dr. Jones estimated that 
27.8 percent or 15,740 students would transfer under the statute.
213
 Of 
these numbers, Dr. Jones testified that 22.7 percent, or approximately 
3,567 students, would transfer to the CSD.
214
 The CSD has 
approximately 2,500 students in its district.
215
 Dr. Jones‘s estimate, 
then, could double the CSD student population overnight.
216
 The 
 
 212. See E. Terrence Jones, Transferring To St. Louis County Schools: How Many City of 
St. Louis Students Would Make the Change? (2011) (unpublished report) (on file with the 
author), available at http://www.claytonschools.net/cms/lib/MO01000419/Centricity/Domain/ 
1/JonesReport_12012011_Rev.pdf [hereinafter Jones Report]. Dr. Jones worked with the 
lawyers for the defense to determine subject matter applicability. After creating the questions, 
he hired a telephone survey company to actually conduct the telephone interviews. Jones, Test. 
Tr. 75, Mar. 5, 2012 [hereinafter Jones Testimony].  
 213. The report indicated the following:  
Estimated Transfer Rate 
St. Louis Public Schools   29.5%  (+/- 3.6%) 
Charter Schools    24.1%  (+/- 3.4%) 
Private/Parochial Schools   19.4%  (+/- 3.2%) 
VICC Participants    42.7%  (+/- 3.9%) 
Estimated Transfer Numbers 
St. Louis Public Schools   8,318  (+/- 1,015) 
Charter Schools    1,746   (+/- 247) 
Private/Parochial Schools   2,757  (+/- 455) 
VICC Participants    2,248   (+/- 205) 
Children W/ Special Needs   3,157   (+/-2,801 & 3,513). 
See Jones Report, supra note 212, at 11–12. Jones testified that all of his numbers for private 
and parochial school students included homeschooled students. Jones Testimony, supra note 
212, at 84. 
 214. Jones Report, supra note 212, at 9. The Jones Report also found:  
12.1% would transfer to the Kirkwood School District; 11.8% would transfer to the 
Lindbergh School District; 11.2% would transfer to the Rockwood School District; 
11.1% would transfer to ―some other‖ School District; 11.0% would transfer to the 
Ladue School District; 7.3% would transfer to the Brentwood School District; and 
12.8% did not know or did not answer.  
Id. With respect to the figures for Clayton, the report indicated as follows: 
Among the 27.8% transfer rate group, 22.7% selected the Clayton School District as 
their first choice. That yields a 6.3% transfer rate for the Clayton School District. 
Applying this rate to the 56,619 City students yields a transfer estimate of 3,567. 
Incorporating the sampling error (plus-or-minus 1.9% at the 95% confidence level), 
the bracketed estimate is between 2,491 and 4,643, with 3,567 being the best estimate. 
Id. at 11. 
 215. Wilkinson, Test. Tr. 163, Mar. 5, 2012 [hereinafter Wilkinson Testimony]. 
 216. Clayton‘s Post-Trial Brief, supra note 204, at 21. 
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testimony adduced by defendant CSD and its taxpayers at the trial 
was that based on these estimates, it would be impossible for the 
CSD to plan for such a contingency.
217
 
The SLPSD raised different impossibility concerns, a key 
argument being that compliance with section 167.131 would cause 
the SLPSD to go bankrupt. Specifically, section 167.131 applies to 
all children who live in the City of St. Louis whether they attend 
public school in St. Louis or not. Of the 56,619 school-age children 
living in St. Louis, thousands do not attend public schools in St. 
Louis but, rather, attend private and parochial schools, and of those, 
an estimated 7,000 would take advantage of the statute and 
transfer.
218
 The significance of this data, if reliable, is that there is a 
significant population, including charter school students, private 
school students, and homeschooled students, for whom the St. Louis 
school district currently receives no funding from the State.
219
 Under 
section 167.131, the SLPSD, as the unaccredited district, would have 
to pay tuition to the receiving district, in this case the CSD. This 
figure, the SLPSD contended, could be between $260 million and 
$280 million.
220
 The SLPSD would add on to this another $40-$60 
million in transportation costs if the SLPSD were also required to 
provide the transportation for each of the potential 15,750 students 
living in St. Louis who would be likely to transfer.
221
 SLPSD 
 
 217. Id. at 21–22. As an example, Dr. Wilkinson testified to the inability to know how 
many additional teachers one would need to hire, textbooks to order, and additional resources. 
Depending on the numbers, additional classrooms and even school buildings or other meeting 
space would be required immediately. Wilkinson Testimony, supra note 215, at 191–93. 
 218. Jones Report, supra note 212, at 11–12. See also Adams Testimony, supra note 157, 
at 452–53. 
 219. The SLPSD receives money from the State of Missouri for each student who attends 
public school in the SLPSD. If a student does not attend school in the SPLSD, then the district 
receives no state money for that student. See MO. REV. STAT. § 163.036, -.021 (2012). See also 
Banks Testimony, supra note 208, at 376. The Jones Report, then, if accurate, would portend a 
significant monetary outlay by the SLPSD to any other receiving district under section 167.131 
for students who do not attend school in the SLPSD.  
 220. See Post-Trial Brief of SLPS Parties Relating to Impossibility of Compliance with 
§ 167.131 at 4, Turner v. Clayton Sch. Dist., No. 12SL-CC00411 (St. Louis Cnty. Ct. Apr. 10, 
2012) [hereinafter Post-Trial Brief of SLPS re: Impossibility].  
 221. Id. at 5. Whether the SLPSD is statutorily required to provide for the transportation of 
each child who seeks to transfer under section 167.131 also was contested. The SLPSD argued 
it was only obligated to choose one district for which it was obligated to provide transportation. 
Students who elected to transfer to that district would thus have transportation. Students who 
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contended that this would deplete its finances, leaving it unable to 
adequately educate the remaining students who did not transfer under 
section 167.131.
222
 The Superintendent of the SLPSD, Kelvin Adams, 
testified that it would be impossible to educate children who 
remained in the SLPSD if it had to pay for transfers pursuant to 
section 167.131.
223
 
 
did not elect to attend that district would be left to get to school on their own. This meant 
parents or other caregivers would have to transport the students, or the student might possibly 
be able to rely on the public transportation system. Of course, under this interpretation, the 
number of students likely to transfer, indeed able to transfer, would be limited to those with 
access to transportation. This cuts against the predominately low-income children in the district. 
This is not to say that low-income necessarily means one does not have access to transportation, 
but it does increase the likelihood that one does not have access to transportation. The plaintiffs, 
however, argued that the SLPSD would have to transport children to whatever school they 
decided to attend. See Kistner Interview, supra note 175. The statutory language on 
transportation of students under section 167.131 can be found at supra note 184. 
 222. Post-Trial Brief of SLPS re: Impossibility, supra note 220, at 6. 
 223. Id. at 5–6. Additionally, the SLPSD argued that the obligation of section 167.131 
made it impossible to regain accreditation for the SLPSD to do its job. Id. at 7–10. It also 
contended that compliance with the statute was in direct conflict with its obligations under the 
1999 Settlement in Liddell. In other words, how can the SLPSD work towards desegregation 
while simultaneously contributing to segregation by paying for white students in St. Louis City 
to attend schools in St. Louis County? Finally, the SLPSD argued that complying with section 
167.131 would leave no provisions for children with special needs in St. Louis. According to 
the SLPSD, section 167.131 does not deal with the education of children with special needs. 
While the SLPSD has a federal obligation to educate such children within its district, SLPSD 
believes it is not clear that it has this right if the children voluntarily transfer to another district. 
Id. at 13–14. To the extent there is an obligation to provide special needs services to every 
child, no matter where that child attends school, the SLPSD says this is impossible. Id. at 10–
12. It cannot send support to every single school district a child decides to transfer to, in order 
to service that child. The receiving school district, according to the SLPSD, has no obligation to 
provide special services to these children. There is a huge risk that these children will be lost in 
the shuffle: 
[SLPSD] faces the impossible choice of either complying with § 167.131 for all 
students and thereby attempting to shoulder the enormous burden of providing special 
services in every school in St. Louis County where [SLPSD]-resident special needs 
children decide to attend, or following the letter of IDEA and the state statutes and 
regulations and offer FAPE [―a free and appropriate public education‖] only in its own 
facilities whenever such a placement would be appropriate. If [SLPSD] choose the 
latter course, it will, in effect, be telling children with disabilities to choose between 
attending a County school or receiving special services, because SSD [the Special 
School District] will not provide services to City residents in County schools and 
[SLPSD] cannot.  
Id. at 12.  
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The plaintiff and the State of Missouri argued that impossibility 
could only be raised as a defense in a contract action.
224
 This was not 
a contract action. Moreover, both agreed that even if impossibility 
could be used as a defense in the case, impossibility could not be 
based on speculation.
225
 This was particularly true given that as of the 
date of the trial, only a few parents had even inquired as to the 
possibility of transferring their children into schools within the 
CSD.
226
  
On May 1, 2012, judgment was entered in favor of the 
defendants.
227
 As relates to this Article, the trial court found that 
section 167.131 was a violation of the Hancock Amendment to the 
Missouri Constitution because it was an unfunded mandate;
228
 and 
that it was impossible for the defendants to comply with section 
167.131.
229
 Because the case involves the constitutionality of a 
statute, the appeal went directly to the Missouri Supreme Court.
230
  
C. St. Louis Gains Provisional Accreditation 
As discussed earlier,
231
 the Special Administrative Board (SAB) 
has governed the SLPSD since 2007 when the district last lost 
 
 224. See, e.g., supra note 210. 
 225. For example, the State admitted that the number of transfers might be such that 
payment by the SLPSD becomes impossible, but went on to argue that this ―is not, however, an 
issue that can be decided today. A determination of that issue would require a real set of facts, 
not a hypothetical projection.‖ State Post-Trial Brief, supra note 210, at 20. 
 226. See, e.g., Kistner Interview, supra note 175; see also Wilkinson Testimony, supra 
note 215, at 227 (noting that there have been only two hundred to three hundred inquiries over 
the past five years). Moreover, CSD officials admitted that it was possible to educate 
somewhere between 300–999 students with short notice. State Post-Trial Brief, supra note 210, 
at 22. The reliability of the numbers in the Jones Report is crucial. 
 227. Turner v. Clayton Sch. Dist., Nos. 12SL-CC00411, 07SL-CC00605 (St. Louis Cnty. 
Ct. May 1, 2012). 
 228. Id. at 13. 
 229. Id. at 14. There were two other findings not relevant to this Article but, ironically, 
they may play a role in the continued life of the case during the appeal. One was the finding by 
the trial court that the sole remaining plaintiff owed the CSD tuition for all of the year‘s tuition 
agreements that were in effect while the SLPSD was unaccredited. Second was the trial court‘s 
finding that based on the fact that the defendants prevailed on the constitutional issue, they were 
entitled to costs and attorneys‘ fees. Id. at 16. 
 230. MO. CONST. art. V, § 3 (2011). Notices of appeal have been filed. Notice of Appeal, 
Turner v. Clayton Sch. Dist., No. 07SL-CC00605 (St. Louis Cnty. Ct. June 4, 2012). 
 231. See supra notes 169–71 and accompanying text. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol40/iss1/2
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2012]  Minnie Liddell‘s Forty-Year Quest 51 
 
 
accreditation. Since the current superintendent, Kelvin Adams, and 
the SAB have been in place, the district has made progress. First, 
unlike prior years,
232
 the leadership shown by Superintendent Adams 
and the SAB has been strong, steady, consistent, functional, and 
productive. Second, the district is now financially stable.
233
 
Additionally, there have been four years of consistent increases in 
academic achievement levels, the number of graduates, and 
attendance.
234
 The district has doubled its accreditation points since 
2009.
235
 The African-American students attending magnet schools in 
the district have even outperformed the VICC transfer students on 
standardized testing.
236
 Other supports have been put in place 
including support to teachers, principals, and the addition of all-day 
pre-kindergarten classrooms.
237
 As a result of this progress, the 
district was granted provisional accreditation in October of 2012.
238
 
 
 232. See supra note 158. 
 233. See Press Release, St. Louis Office of Public Information, Julie Linder, SLPS 
Receives $96.1 Million from Desegregation Capital find Money Allocated over 3-Year Period 
to Fund Academic Programs and Stabilize Finances (Nov. 21, 2011) (on file with author) 
[hereinafter Press Release]. 
 234. Adams Testimony, supra note 157, at 435–38.  
 235. See, e.g., Elisa Crouch, St. Louis Schools Are Near Reaccreditation, Data Show, 
STLTODAY.COM (Jan. 18, 2012), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/education/st-louis-
schools-are-near-reaccreditation-data-show/article_312a4e1c-8635-55ca-a302-dc11b1018da9 
.html [hereinafter Crouch, St. Louis Near Reaccreditation]; SLPS Gets 6 Accreditation Points 
From DESE, Shows Academic Improvement For Four Consecutive Years, ST. LOUIS AM. (Sept. 
19, 2011), http://www.stlamerican.com/news/local_news/article_1f29e11c-e308-11e0-8c2c-001 
cc4c002e0.html; see also Adams Testimony, supra note 157, at 446. 
 236. Elisa Crouch, Blacks' Test Scores Show Some Schools In City Excel, STLTODAY.COM 
(May 11, 2012), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/education/blacks-test-scores-show-some-
schools-in-city-excel/article_8857f7ac-8f1a-5165-b5d2-69dd0b834738.html (―[D]ata, provided 
by St. Louis Public Schools, show that black students in the district's magnet and choice 
programs outpaced transfer students on eight of 12 measures of the state test last year, as well 
as the high school English and math exams.‖); see also 2011 Map Test Index Analysis; VICC 
Students Compared to SLPS African American Magnet School Students, ST. LOUIS PUBLIC 
SCHOOLS (2012), http://www.slps.org/cms/lib03/MO01001157/Centricity/Domain/3/2012/2011 
%20MAP%20TEST%20INDEX%20ANALYSIS1.pdf. 
 237. See, e.g., Adams Testimony, supra note 157, at 458–59. A communal effort and 
network, including a support network, engaged parents, teachers who have expectations of 
them, and ―wraparound services‖ will help children stay focused, engaged, and in school. Dr. 
Adams defines wraparound services as those that include a host of services needed in the 
communities where the children live. They include medical and mental health services, case 
management, and attention to housing and employment needs. Adams Interview, supra note 
126.  
 238. Jessica Bock, State Board Gives Provisional Accreditation for St. Louis Public 
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Although there is some reason to celebrate the grant of provisional 
status, this decision is not without controversy, nor is the district 
completely out of danger.
239
 Examples of some of the challenges that 
remain include the following: (1) Some think the decision was purely 
political. Not wanting to take the risk of waiting to see if the Missouri 
Supreme Court would affirm the trial court‘s ruling that the statute 
was unconstitutional as applied to the CSD and the SLPSD, some 
believe the State Board simply decided it was safer to award 
provisional accreditation.
240
 (2) Some believe provisional 
accreditation sends the wrong message to parents concerning the 
quality of St. Louis schools. Responses from two parents are 
illustrative of these concerns. One parent stated that ―[t]he 
reclassification of the Saint Louis Public Schools by the Missouri 
State Board of Education really doesn‘t change much for my kids or 
me . . . . It doesn‘t change the fact that in my son‘s 3rd grade class, 
only 3 percent of students are on grade level.‖241 Another parent 
wrote an open letter to the State Board asking that it not award 
provisional accreditation to the district. In support of his argument, he 
stated: 
State Education Commissioner Chris Nicastro indicated last 
month that St. Louis Public Schools must show persistent 
 
Schools, STLTODAY.COM (Oct. 16, 2012), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/education/state-
board-gives-provisional-accreditation-for-st-louis-public-schools/article_27dc696e-596a-5c4f-
a5ad-e5c8d224971f.html#.UH20wxY2kDM.email. 
 239. As Washington University Professor of Education and Urban Studies William Tate 
observed: ―The way you have to think of it is, it‘s not pretty yet, but it‘s moving in the direction 
of where there is possibly hope.‖ Id. SAB member Melanie Adams stated similarly: ―There is 
not a person in this district who believes the district has arrived at some point, and that this is 
the final frontier . . . . This is simply, look at the scores, validate the work that has taken place. 
This is an interim step.‖ Id.  
 240. None of my sources wish to go on record for this proposition. The timing does strike 
one as interesting. This is particularly true since the Commissioner of Education for the State of 
Missouri has said repeatedly over the past few months that she would want to see several years 
of consistent performance before a change in the district‘s status. See, e.g., Joe Robertson, In 
Missouri‘s School Performance Reports, KC Gets a Better Score, KANSAS CITY STAR, Aug. 14, 
2012 (quoting Commissioner Nicastro: ―We‘re looking for sustained improvement over time,‖ 
she said. ―We want at least three years of data. . . . One year of fluctuation does not long-term 
improvement necessarily make.‖).  
 241. CEAM Responds to SLPS Classification, CHILDREN‘S EDUCATION ALLIANCE OF 
MISSOURI (Oct. 16, 2012), http://www.childrenseducationalliance-mo.org/accountability-
transparency/msip5/ceam-responds-to-slps-classification. 
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improvement over time before changes are made to [its] 
accreditation status, and rightfully so. Despite last month‘s 
headlines that [the SLPSD] had made some minor 
improvements, there were other areas that actually fared worse 
than previous years: In math for example, scores dropped from 
30% of students on grade level in 2011 to 27% this past year. 
Students who scored at grade level in reading dropped from 
32% in 2011 to 30% in 2012. Other indicators continue to 
remain poor: the district‘s graduation rate has remained steady 
at just over 50% and the average ACT score has held at about 
16. 
Because Missouri doesn‘t rate individual schools, parents must 
rely on the district‘s accreditation status to make a 
determination about the quality of an individual school. If the 
state board were to give [the SLPSD] its accreditation back, 
parents and the public will be misled about the quality of the 
district, thereby making the complicated process of identifying 
the educational option for their child even more difficult.
242
 
(3) Additionally, some controversy remains with respect to cheating 
allegations at various elementary schools with the resulting 
crackdown seeking dramatic drops in scores.
243
 (4) There is also 
some controversy involved with the district‘s strategy for one of the 
fourteen performance standards, and that is testing only those 
 
 242. Andrew Hesse, An Open Letter to the Missouri State Board of Education, CHILDREN‘S 
EDUCATION ALLIANCE OF MISSOURI (Sept. 16, 2012), http://www.childrenseducationalliance-
mo.org/accountability-transparency/an-open-letter-to-the-missouri-state-board-of-education. 
Moreover, although based on 2008–09 data, there is some evidence that many underperforming 
schools are contained within certain zip codes. Four such zip codes, for example, had no 
schools within the zip code that met at least half of the Annual Proficiency Target tests in 
Communication Arts and Math. Schools that met at least half of the Annual Proficiency Target 
in Communication Arts and Math, ―meaning that in 2008 at least 25.5 percent of students were 
proficient or above in Communication Arts and at least 22.5 percent of students were proficient 
or above in Math,‖ are defined in the report as Tier I Schools. The report not only found a 
dearth of Tier 1 schools, but it also found several instances where thousands of children resided 
in districts where there was a complete lack of neighborhood performing schools. See IFF, THE 
CITY OF ST. LOUIS MO., PUBLIC SCHOOL IN ST. LOUIS: PLACE, PERFORMANCE (2011), 
http://stlouis-mo.gov/government/departments/mayor/documents/upload//STL-Place-Performa 
nce-Promise.pdf. 
 243. Bock, supra note 238.  
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students likely to pass.
244
 (5) Moreover, as revealed by the Schott 
Foundation for Public Education in its latest report, black males in St. 
Louis suffer the worst, and they are suffering at alarming, astounding, 
and heartbreaking rates. For example, in addition to the fact that out-
of-school suspension rates for black males in the state and in St. 
Louis are among the highest in the nation,
245
 only 33 percent of black 
males in St. Louis graduated with their cohorts in the 2009–10 school 
year,
246
 and the achievement gaps for students at or above proficiency 
in reading and in math for black males and white males was 25 
percent and 31 percent, respectively.
247
 
While accreditation is a step in the right direction, there is strong 
evidence here that accreditation does not mean quality has been 
obtained. They are not one and the same. The journey continues. So, 
although now provisionally accredited, the SLPSD still has a very 
long way to go. This struggle for quality education is an old story, a 
long battle, and it is still ongoing.  
III. THE DREAM REMAINS ELUSIVE 
Beyond our personal disappointment for our situation, there's 
an enormous sense of injustice for all the kids that are trapped 
in the city unaccredited school district. . . . By the time it‘s 
reaccredited, these kids would have spent well over half their 
school life in an unaccredited or provisionally accredited 
school system. And they have no way out.
248
 
Although there were big hopes for the Liddell settlement, the 
reality is that the settlements of the case did not result in the 
perceived gains. Dr. William Danforth stated that there were really 
two promises contained within the 1999 Settlement Agreement. One 
 
 244. Id. (―Gains in Algebra I test scores—one of the state‘s performance standards—could 
be attributed to the district‘s strategy of testing only those who are likely to pass. Other students 
wait to take the test until they receive extra help in the subject. Although the state requires the 
district to administer the test before a student graduates, the district‘s dropout rate is high.‖). 
 245. See supra note 167.  
 246. See Urgency Now, supra note 153, at 25. 
 247. See The Urgency of Now: Missouri, SCHOTT FOUNDATION FOR PUBLIC EDUCATION 
1–2 (2012), http://www.blackboysreport.org/states/missouri.pdf. 
 248. Crouch, Whatever the Outcome, supra note 172 (quoting former plaintiff William 
Drendel). 
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was that the school system would do what it agreed to do, and two, 
that it would accomplish its mission.
249
 While Dr. Danforth believes 
that the system has, by and large, done what it promised, it has not 
accomplished what it hoped. Attendance, graduation, and academic 
achievement levels remain troublesome, even in 2012 and even 
though the district is now provisionally accredited.  
The minute the SLPSD lost accreditation in 2007, section 167.131 
was there, presumably as a safety net of sorts, to save children and 
thus finally provide, once and for all, the quality education long 
sought. But the red herring of the statute was revealed at closer look. 
Section 167.131 really is nothing more than a mirage. The statute, at 
best, can provide a path to a quality education for some children: i.e., 
those children whose families not only want to invoke the statute but 
also are in a position to do so. Those children will be provided with 
an opportunity for a quality education. But what about the remaining 
students? What fate befalls those who either cannot or otherwise do 
not take advantage of the benefits section 167.131 has to offer? 
Let us consider, for a moment, what could happen if the Missouri 
Supreme Court upholds the constitutionality of the statute in Turner. 
There is some chance that such a decision will hurt both the SLPSD 
and St. Louis. The transfer of children under the statute financially 
weakens the district where those children live. Now, it is very true 
that there is simply no way to know how many children would take 
advantage of section 167.131. The only thing that currently exists on 
this point is the report prepared by the defense expert Dr. Jones in the 
case.
250
 Assuming some students do transfer, some of those seeking 
transfer will undoubtedly be children the SLPSD is already 
educating, others might include students currently participating in the 
voluntary transfer program from the 1999 Settlement Agreement.
251
 
 
 249. Interview with Dr. William Danforth, in St. Louis, Mo. (July 30, 2009) (on file with 
author).  
 250. The Jones Report can be found at supra note 212. 
 251. Children who participate in the voluntary transfer program are assigned to one of four 
attendance zones. Based on the child‘s residence, an attendance zone for transfer purposes is 
assigned. With some minor exceptions, children participating in the program have to attend the 
suburban school district associated with their zone. See Transfer Handbook, supra note 129, at 
5. This controls how many transfers a given school can receive at any time. There is a chance, 
of course, that a student who currently attends one school under the voluntary transfer program 
would elect to transfer to another school, a school of her choice. While the number of students 
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Other potential transfers could hail from private schools, parochial 
schools, charter schools,
252
 and might even include currently 
homeschooled students. There may be others, like the children in 
Turner, who currently attend suburban schools pursuant to tuition 
agreements between their parents and those schools. Not every 
student will transfer. Indeed, thousands are likely to remain in the 
SLPSD.
253
 
Now, St. Louis‘s allocated dollars from the State are based on the 
school‘s average daily attendance.254 If a student lives in the SLPSD 
but does not attend a SLPSD school, SLPSD receives no state money 
for that child.
255
 If that same child transfers pursuant to section 
167.131, every dollar in tuition that the SLPSD has to pay the 
receiving district is purely out of the SLPSD operating budget with 
no help from the State.
256
 Using the two children who remained in the 
Turner case at the time of trial as an example, the SLPSD would have 
to write a check of $40,057.38 to the CSD for these children with no 
reimbursement from the State.
257
 Depending on how many students 
 
who may elect to do that is unknown, there clearly is some number. Jones Report, supra note 
212, at 11, actually forecasted that 2,248 students would elect to transfer.  
 252. See, e.g., Elisa Crouch, St. Louis Firefighters Sue School Districts Over Transfers, 
STLTODAY.COM (Jan. 25, 2012), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/education/st-louis-fire 
fighters-sue-school-districts-over-transfers/article_2a2af1c8-4622-11e1-89dc-0019bb30f31a.ht 
ml#ixzz1zO9HHKph. St. Louis firefighters have to live in St. Louis. Many of them do not send 
their children to the public schools in St. Louis, opting instead to pay parochial school tuition or 
enter into tuition agreements with suburban school districts as the parents did in the Turner 
case. See also Heather Hollingsworth, NAACP Questions St. Louis Charter School Closures, 
KMOV.COM (Apr. 22, 2012), http://www.kmov.com/news/just-posted/NAACP-weighs-in-on-
St-Louis-charter-closures-148458865.html (explaining that after the state closed six charter 
schools in St. Louis, the NAACP questioned why the 3,500 children affected have not been 
allowed to transfer to accredited districts pursuant to the Turner decision and considering 
litigation). 
 253. Superintendent Kelvin Adams testified that of the 8,313 students that the SLPSD 
currently educates who it is believed would transfer under section 167.131, another 16,600 
students would remain in the district. Adams Testimony, supra note 157, at 465, 474.  
 254. In 2011, the state funded 14.8 percent of the $15,861 average daily attendance 
expenditure of the St. Louis City District, which equals $2,347.43. See School Finance Report, 
supra note 177. Currently, the SLPSD receives $3,620.27 per pupil for weighed average daily 
attendance in its schools from the State. See Banks Testimony, supra note 208, at 386–87.  
 255. Banks Testimony, supra note 208, at 375–76; see also Adams Testimony, supra note 
157, at 452–53. 
 256. Banks Testimony, supra note 208, at 375–77. 
 257. Id. at 382.  
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transfer, the costs of transfer could bankrupt the school district.
258
 
Moreover, even if one only considers the children that the SLPSD 
currently is educating, there is still a loss to the district‘s operating 
revenues.
259
 Expenses in this case would not decrease because the 
children go elsewhere. The district would still have to provide the 
same level of resources to the other children in the district (teachers, 
transportation, and other resources) whether a given child attends 
school in the SLPSD or in the receiving district.
260
 Although the 
SLPSD has recently become financially solvent,
261
 sending money 
out of the district will not help St. Louis on its journey to providing a 
quality education for its children.
262
 
With less money available, it simply becomes harder for the 
SLPSD to educate the children who remain in the St. Louis public 
schools.
263
 There is some irony in the fact that despite the Liddell 
settlements of 1983 and 1999 and the triggering of section 167.131, 
poor African-American children find themselves in struggling and 
under-resourced public schools. The 1983 Liddell Settlement, recall, 
resulted in three types of relief for students: magnet schools, inter-
district transfers, and capital improvements and other resource 
infusions to the children who would neither participate in the magnet 
schools nor participate in the transfer program.
264
 The children in this 
latter category never got all that they were promised.
265
 Many of 
these children graduated from or otherwise left schools that were not 
 
 258. Adams Testimony, supra note 157, at 475, 511. 
 259. Id. at 453, 455–56. 
 260. Id. at 455.  
 261. See Press Release, supra note 233. 
 262. Adams Testimony, supra note 157, at 453–54, 479. Additionally, section 167.131 
does no good for receiving districts. The statute is simply silent on whether a student has to 
apply for admission before some deadline, how many may apply before space is exhausted, and 
the like. While many challenge the Jones Report as being overblown in terms of actual transfer 
possibilities, the reality remains that the statute takes away all of the normal tools in place for 
schools to prepare for increases in student populations. Such surprises are not good for anyone.  
 263. Adams Testimony, supra note 157, at 475–78. See also Susan Carlson, Guest 
Commentary: Time For A Turner Fix, STLTODAY.COM (May 8, 2012), http://www.stltoday 
.com/news/opinion/guest-commentary-time-for-a-turner-fix/article_8cf291ff-cb87-5fa2-9d24-7 
a3812490c7.html (―[A]llowing students to transfer out [of an unaccredited district] should not 
come at a cost of draining an unaccredited school district of the financial resources needed to 
provide a quality education to students who remain.‖); see also Jones Report, supra note 212.  
 264. See, e.g., La Pierre, supra note 68, at 1001. 
 265. Id. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
58 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 40:1 
 
 
providing them with a quality education. The students in the SLPSD 
at the time of the 1999 Settlement Agreement also found themselves 
attending schools in a technically unaccredited school district.
266
 And, 
section 167.131, if upheld, may see thousands of children leave their 
school district to take advantage of the statute while thousands are 
left behind.
267
 With the limited dollars allocated for those who remain 
being mailed to neighboring suburbs, these children are assured of 
continued second-class citizenship. One must wonder how many of 
these children are either relatives or descendants of those left behind 
in 1983, 1999, and 2007. 
A potential irony in the implementation of section 167.131 is that 
if Dr. Jones‘s conclusions are correct, the statute could promote more 
segregated public schools in both the city and in the receiving 
suburbs. According to Dr. Jones, a high percentage of white students 
would transfer to suburban schools.
268
 The SLPSD is comprised of 
over 81 percent African-American students
269
 and is engaged in 
voluntary efforts to desegregate its schools. Dr. Jones testified that 
18,563 of the 56,619 students living within the SLPSD are white and 
26 percent, or 4,937, would transfer to suburban schools if given the 
opportunity afforded under section 167.131.
270
 To the extent any of 
these 4,937 students currently attend schools in the SLPSD, the result 
would leave even fewer integration options. Section 167.131 allows 
the subsidizing of these children into already highly segregated 
suburban schools.
271
 
 
 266. See supra note 144. 
 267. See supra note 253. 
 268. Jones Testimony, supra note 212, at 86; see also Adams Testimony, supra note 157, 
at 468.  
 269. The very latest statistics, as of October of 2012, indicate that the SLPSD is 82 percent 
African-American, 3 percent Hispanic, 3 percent Asian, and 12 percent Caucasian. It is a 
majority minority district. Eighty-eight percent of the students in the district also qualify for 
free and reduced lunch. See E-mail from Linda Riekes, Development and Partnership Officer, 
SLPSD, to author (Oct. 12, 2012, 17:09 CST) (on file with author) (attaching St. Louis public 
school demographics as of October 12, 2012). See generally District Demographic Data, MO. 
DEP‘T OF ELEMENTARY & SECONDARY EDUC. (July 06, 2012, 11:47 AM), http://mcds.dese.mo 
.gov/guidedinquiry/District%20and%20Building%20Student%20Indicators/District%20Demog
raphic%20Data.aspx [hereinafter District Demographic Data]. 
 270. Jones Testimony, supra note 212, at 86. 
 271. See District Demographic Data, supra note 269 (showing the following, approximate 
demographic makeup of suburban districts: Bayless 150 black, 1,200 white; Brentwood 190 
black, 590 white; Clayton 550 black, 1,800 white; Hancock Place 250 black, 4,000 white; 
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Section 167.131 is unhealthy for the City of St. Louis as well.
272
 
St. Louis‘s population has been in decline for the past several 
decades. The recent 2010 Census data shows the St. Louis population 
at 319,294. This is down 8.3 percent from the 2000 Census.
273
 The 
latest numbers, taken in July of 2011, reveal an additional decline: 
318,069, down from 319,294.
274
 The new numbers are a continued 
reflection of the 2010 Census, when St. Louis County fell below one 
million residents, and the city of St. Louis continued a sixty-year 
drop.
275
 At its peak in 1950, St. Louis had 856,796 residents, and it 
was one of the ten largest cities in the country.
276
 Now, it is a shell of 
its former self. Moreover, ―[n]ot surprisingly given its politics and 
 
Ladue 600 black, 2,800 white; Lindbergh 400 black, 5,000 white; Mehlville 950 black, 9,000 
white; Parkway 2,700 black, 11,500 white; Rockwood 2,400 black, 18,100 white; Valley Park 
250 black, 900 white; Webster Groves 1,900 black, 3,000 white). Of course, not all suburban 
school districts in the St. Louis metropolitan area are majority white. In theory, then, a student 
could transfer to a black suburban district. It does happen to be the case, however, that the 
suburban districts with the highest student performance on the statewide Missouri Assessment 
Program testing figures are primarily white school districts. See APR Summary Report—K–12—
Public, MO. DEP‘T OF ELEMENTARY & SECONDARY EDUC. (July 06, 2012, 2:00 PM), http://mc 
ds.dese.mo.gov/guidedinquiry/APR%20%20State%20Accountability/APR%20Summary%20R
eport%20-%20K-12%20-20Public.aspx?rp:COUNTY_DISTRICT_CODE=048914 [hereinafter 
APR Summary Report].  
 272. Of course, there are other school districts within the state, too, that currently are 
unaccredited or in danger of losing accreditation. Currently, three of Missouri‘s 522 school 
districts—Normandy, Kansas City, and Riverview Gardens—are unaccredited. State Board 
Supports Accreditation Legislation, MO. DEP‘T OF ELEMENTARY & SECONDARY EDUC. (Feb. 
21, 2012), http://dese.mo.gov/news/2012/accreditation-legislation.htm; Dale Singer, Normandy 
Schools Lose Accreditation, ST. LOUIS BEACON (Sept. 17, 2012), https://www.stlbeacon.org/ 
#!/content/27048/normandy_accreditation_decision_091412. Two more, exclusive of St. Louis, 
are provisionally accredited—Calhoun R-VIII and Swedeborg—while three others are on the 
brink of provisional accreditation—Hickman Mills, University City, and Winfield R-IV. See 
Unaccredited and Provisionally Accredited—State Board Decides, MISSOURI NEA (Sept. 20, 
2011), http://www.mnea.org/Missouri/News/Unaccredited_and_provisionally_accredited_State 
_Bo_187.aspx.  
 273. U.S. Census Bureau Delivers Missouri's 2010 Census Population Totals, Including 
First Look at Race and Hispanic Origin Data for Legislative Redistricting, 2010 CENSUS (Feb. 
24, 2011), available at http://2010.census.gov/news/releases/operations/cb11-cn49.html2010 
(showing St. Louis population figures). 
 274. Doug Moore, St. Louis Region's Population Growth Lagging That of Nation, 
STLTODAY.COM (Apr. 5, 2012), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/metro/st-louis-region-s-
population-growth-lagging-that-of-nation/article_5d588480-a6fb-51d9-acf7-7d821cd8337b.htm 
l#ixzz1zVbHB7Pj. A statistician with the Census Bureau stated that the 318,069 figure is 
determined by taking 2010 Census numbers, adding births, subtracting deaths, and tracking 
migration both from within the country and internationally. Id.  
 275. Id. 
 276. Id. 
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demographics, St. Louis [also] retained (decade after decade) its 
dubious distinction as one of the nation‘s most segregated 
metropolitan areas,‖277 a distinction it continues to hold in the twenty-
first century.
278
 For decades, private discrimination, racial zoning, 
state-enforced restrictive covenants, redlining by banks and realtors, 
incentives by the federal government, and a host of other public 
policies in St. Louis, all combined to keep African-Americans 
trapped in certain neighborhoods, as well as in the poor and 
segregated schools that Minnie Liddell‘s children faced in the 1960s 
and 1970s. Historian Colin Gordon noted in a recent visit to St. 
Louis: 
The sociological work of the 1970s—much of it done in St. 
Louis—which plumbed the motives of families of ordinary 
means, found that black and white families wanted exactly the 
same things. They wanted safer neighborhoods and better 
schools. But the policies opened those opportunities to white 
residents but not to black for what were the decisive decades, 
from the 1920s to the 1970s, in the shaping of the region.
279
 
 
 277. GORDON, supra note 22, at 11.  
 278. Gus Lubin & Christine Jenkins, The 22 Most Segregated Cities in America, BUSINESS 
INSIDER (Apr. 1, 2011), http://www.businessinsider.com/most-segregated-cities-in-america-
2011-3?op=1. St. Louis ranked sixth out of twenty-two cities, and its white-black dissimilarity 
score rated a whopping 70.6 percent. Id. This means that 70.6 percent of one group would have 
to move in order to have a positive effect on racial desegregation in a given tract of land! 
Moreover, white flight out of the city has been documented in St. Louis for every decade since 
the 1940s. See GORDON, supra note 22, at 22–38. This trend continued in the 2010 Census data. 
See Doug Moore, Census Shows City Is ‗Hollowing Out‘, STLTODAY.COM (Feb. 25, 2011), 
http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/metro/article_4af01497-bca8-5b63-8cc6-1c724c11dd08.ht 
ml (―The population loss in both the city and the county came from substantial drops in their 
white population. . . [but u]nlike towns in the Metro East, such as Belleville, the gain of blacks 
and other minorities in St. Louis County was not enough to offset the loss of whites.‖). 
 279. Mary Delach Leonard, History Raises Painful Issues Regarding the City‘s Economic 
Struggles, ST. LOUIS BEACON (Jan. 26, 2011), https://www.stlbeacon.org/#!/content/17139/ 
inteview_with_colin_gordon. The correlation between a quality education and employment 
remains true in 2012. African-Americans continue to struggle with employment opportunities, 
in large measure, because of their lower educational attainment. See, e.g., U.S. DEP‘T OF 
LABOR, THE AFRICAN AMERICAN LABOR FORCE IN THE RECOVERY, http://www.dol.gov/_sec/ 
media/reports/blacklaborforce/ (last visited July 08, 2012); Alexis Garrett Stodghill, African-
American Unemployment: Connected to Low High School Graduation Rates?, THE GRIO (Jan. 
10, 2012), http://thegrio.com/2012/01/10/african-american-unemployment-connected-to-low-
high-school-graduation-rates/.  
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People are moving out of St. Louis, and the problems of the 
SLPSD clearly have to be part of the reason why. ―[T]he city wants 
to grow . . . but it will not until there is a better choice of quality 
schools.‖280 While we have a long way to go, and a viable school 
district may not be the lone, silver bullet, no one should doubt that a 
viable school district can help substantially in any rebirth of the 
city.
281
 
Of course, the concerns advanced are only worth worrying about 
if the Missouri Supreme Court upholds the validity (and its prior 
2010 interpretation) of section 167.131. But what if the court affirms 
the trial court decision? Would this decision result in quality 
education for the children of the SLPSD? The answer, unfortunately 
and sadly, is not today. As demonstrated earlier, the district, although 
moving towards full accreditation, is far from being able to say it 
provides a quality education to all of its students. Gains are being 
made, but they take time. How much time is, unfortunately, the 
unknown variable.
282
 A real risk exists, then, that by the time gains 
 
 280. Alex Ihnen, In St. Louis Population Decline No Longer Good or Bad, ―It Just Is,‖ 
NEXT STL (Apr. 5, 2012), http://nextstl.com/greater-stl-missouri/in-st-louis-population-decline-
no-longer-good-or-bad-qit-just-isq (quoting Jeff Rainford, Chief of Staff for St. Louis Mayor 
Francis Slay). 
 281. There are other troublesome aspects of section 167.131. For example, the statute 
covers any child living within the district even if that child does not attend the troubled school. I 
am not advocating the exclusion of those children, but I think a priority should be given to the 
children who then currently attend the troubled schools. The statute also has the effect of 
rendering the protections of the Safe Schools Act meaningless. Recall that the Safe Schools Act 
was enacted to give schools some notice and discretion as to who they are willing to admit. See, 
e.g., Turner, 318 S.W.3d 660, 671 n.2 (Mo. 2010) (Breckenridge, J., dissenting). Section 
167.131 removes all discretion from the receiving district and thus renders the protections of the 
statute a nullity. 
 282. C.E.O. of the Schott Foundation, John H. Jackson, recently stated at a Congressional 
Black Caucus legislative conference that: 
The progress among blacks closed the racial divide on graduation rates by 3 
percentage points over nine years to a 26 percentage-point gap. ―At this rate it would 
take 50 years for black males to graduate at the same rate as white males. . . . I don‘t 
think the country can wait. I don‘t think any parent or student can wait for half a 
century to have the same opportunities, education, jobs as their white male 
counterparts.‖ 
Suzanne Gamboa, High School Graduation Rate For Black Males Trails White Students, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 19, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/19/black-male-
hs-graduation-_n_1896490.ht ml?ir=Education (emphasis supplied). 
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are made, the children currently in the SLPSD, and maybe even their 
children, will be long gone from the system.
283
 
CONCLUSION 
Forty years after Minnie Liddell started her journey for a quality 
education, the settlement agreement she worked for twenty-seven 
years to obtain is being phased out,
284
 the SLPSD is not academically 
stable, the legislative front is quiet,
285
 and it is very unclear what the 
 
 283. Lawsuits involving public education equity, adequacy, and desegregation lawsuits are 
often decades old. Of course, you have Liddell as an example. See also, e.g., Abbott ex rel. 
Abbott v. Burke, 20 A.3d 1018 (N.J. 2011), and Sheff v. O‘Neil, No. X07CV894026240S, 2010 
WL 1233971 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 22, 2010). These two cases are representative of the length 
of time it takes cases dealing with these issues to make their way through the judicial system. 
Imagine the toll that the litigation must have on the families and imagine the tremendous sense 
of dreams deferred for the named plaintiff children who age out of public secondary education 
while the cases continue to toil in the system. Relief for these children, too, remains elusive. 
Consider also San Antonio Independent Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). Decided in 
1973, the issue at the heart of that case, equity in public education, continues to be fought at the 
state level. See, e.g., Edgewood Independent Sch. Dist. v. Meno, 917 S.W.2d 717 (Tex. 1995) 
(Edgewood IV); West Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Alanis, 107 S.W. 3d 558 (Tex. 
2003); see also Michael Heise, The Story of San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. 
Rodriguez: School Finance, Local Control, and Constitutional Limits, in EDUCATION LAW 
STORIES 51 (Michael A. Olivas & Ronna Greff Schneider eds., 2007). Let us assume, also, that 
a decision is reached in less than ten years. How long does it take before the decision is 
implemented and results are obtained? Plaintiffs won an equity case in New York almost ten 
years ago. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 801 N.E.2d 326 (N.Y. 2003). Yet, by all 
accounts, New York is still one of the largest underperforming school districts in the nation. 
See, e.g., The Urgency of Now: New York, SCHOTT FOUNDATION FOR PUBLIC EDUCATION 
(2012), http://www.blackboysreport.org/states/new-york.pdf; see also A Rotting Apple: 
Education Redlining in New York City, SCHOTT FOUNDATION FOR PUBLIC EDUCATION, 
http://schottfoundation.org/drupal/docs/redlining-full-report.pdf [hereinafter A Rotting Apple]. 
It makes you wonder: do plaintiffs really ever win? 
 284. Once reaching a high of almost 13,000 African-American students transferred from 
city schools to county schools and just under 1,500 white students transferred from county 
schools to city schools, in the 2010–11 school year, 5,882 African-American students 
transferred from city schools to county schools, and 142 white students transferred from the 
county into city magnet schools. Glaser E-mail Feb. 21, supra note 128.  
 285. The Missouri legislature purportedly attempted to ―fix‖ Turner for two consecutive 
years to no avail. They even ended sessions early as if there was no more work to be done. See, 
e.g., Virginia Young, Missouri Legislature Fails to Pass China Hub Incentives, Local Control, 
STLTODAY.COM (May 14, 2011), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/govt-and-politics/article 
_645de951-67f3-5bc7-bc34-550b9391e39d.html; Missouri Legislature Officially Ends 2011 
Session, COLUMBIA MISSOURIAN (May 27, 2011), http://www.columbiamissourian.com/ 
stories/2011/05/27/missouri-legislature-officially-ends-2011-session.). No other legislation 
attempting to fix Turner passed. See Virginia Young, Legislature Leaves Some Unfinished 
Business, STLTODAY.COM (May 20, 2012), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/metro/legisla 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol40/iss1/2
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Missouri Supreme Court will do with the Turner appeal. (For 
example, now that the SLPSD is provisionally accredited, will it 
continue to decide the case (including the constitutionality of the 
statute or impossibility defenses), or will the court dismiss the case as 
moot? The latter route would leave the trial court‘s determination that 
the statute is unconstitutional in place, thereby forcing other parents 
in unaccredited districts in the state to bear the emotional drain and 
expense of fighting this battle all over again.)
286
 Moreover, might the 
legislature still try, yet a third time, to find a way to insure that the 
Missouri Constitution‘s promise of a free public education includes 
some acceptable definition of quality education so that generations of 
people do not have to keep litigating this question? These are just a 
few of the unknowns in this continually evolving saga.
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ture-leaves-some-unfinished-business/article_26d6fc74-db9f-56b5-9800-ec979a812360.html; 
see also Elisa Crouch, School Transfer Case Set to Open, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 5, 
2012, at A1. This twenty-four-month period of failed legislation has caused some to wonder 
aloud whether race has something to do with this. The overwhelming majority of children 
trapped in unaccredited districts in Missouri are black and attend school in predominantly black 
school districts. Missouri state legislatures are overwhelmingly non-urban, white male. See, 
e.g., Editorial, Our View, The Nicastro Fix Time for Education Commissioner to Stand for Kids, 
ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, May 3, 2012, at A14; see also Hollingsworth, supra note 252. 
 286. Kansas City, the second-largest school district in the state of Missouri, remains 
unaccredited. Litigation over section 167.131 continues to thrive in districts on that side of the 
state. A split opinion was recently rendered on the constitutionality of section 167.131. The 
court held in that case that depending on where and how it is applied, the statute violates the 
Hancock Amendment in some transfer cases but not in others. See Blue Springs R-IV Sch. Dist. 
v. Sch. Dist. of Kansas City Mo., No. 1116-CV 34463 (Cir. Ct. Jackson Cnty., Mo. Aug. 16, 
2012). See also Dave Jordan, Judge Issues Split Decision in Kansas City Schools Student 
Transfer Case, KCTV 5 NEWS (Aug. 16, 2012, 1:46 PM), http://www.kctv5.com/story/ 
19296204/judge-issues-split-decision-in-kansas-city-student-transfer-case.  
 287. Of course, in addition to the battle for quality schools, the battle for integrated schools 
also looms large in St. Louis. The district is over 80 percent black and on free and reduced 
lunch. See supra note 269. We must not forget that quality schools should also include 
integrated schools. Yet, litigants have been stymied since 2007 in their attempts to use race to 
integrate K–12 public schools. See PICS, supra note 21. PICS applied a strict scrutiny test to 
the use of race to integrate public K–12 schools. With respect to the two school districts before 
that Court, in neither case did the Court find that the school district‘s use of race passed was 
narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government interest. Id. at 720. For more on the PICS 
case, see, e.g., Preston C. Green, III, Julie F. Mead, & Joseph O. Oluwole, Parents Involved, 
School Assignment Plans, and the Equal Protection Clause: The Case for Special 
Constitutional Rules, 76 BROOKLYN L. REV. 503 (2011); Erica Frankenberg, Genevieve Siegel-
Hawley & Adai Tefera, School Integration Efforts Three Years After Parents Involved, THE 
CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT (2010), http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/legal-developments/court-dec 
isions/school-integration-efforts-three-years-after-parents-involved/teferea-school-integration-
three-years-after.pdf; Charles E. Dickinson, Accepting Justice Kennedy‘s Challenge: Reviving 
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This state of affairs should make us wonder aloud how forty years 
could have gone by and there be so little progress to show for all of 
the time, the effort, and the expense.
288
 Sure, in many ways things are 
absolutely better than they were in 1972. But sadly, in some very 
important ways they are not.
289
 Noted Civil Rights Attorney Frankie 
Freeman, while Commissioner of the U.S. Civil Rights Commission 
once said: 
[W]e are now on a collision course that may produce within 
our borders two alienated and unequal nations confronting 
each other across a widening gulf created by a dual educational 
system based upon income and race. Our present school crisis 
is a human crisis, engendered and sustained in large part by the 
actions, the apathy, or the shortsightedness of public officials 
and private individuals. It can be resolved only by the 
commitment, the creative energies, and the combined 
 
Race-Conscious School Assignments in the Wake of Parents Involved, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1410 
(2009); Maurice R. Dyson, De Facto Segregation & Group Blindness: Proposals for Narrow 
Tailoring Under a New Viable State Interest in PICS v. Seattle School District, 77 UMKC L. 
REV. 697 (2009); Kimberly J. Freedman, Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle 
School District No. 1: A Return to a Separate and Unequal Society?, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 685 
(2009); Rachel F. Moran, Rethinking Race, Equality, and Liberty: The Unfulfilled Promise of 
Parents Involved, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 1321 (2008); Jonathan L. Entin, Parents Involved and the 
Meaning of Brown: An Old Debate Renewed, 31 SEATTLE UNIV. L. R. 923 (2008); john a. 
powell & Stephen Menendian, Parents Involved: The Mantle of Brown, The Shadow of Plessy, 
46 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 631 (2008). Integration may need to come another way. Consider, 
for example, the data on the use of socioeconomic demographics to integrate schools. See 
generally THE FUTURE OF SCHOOL INTEGRATION: SOCIOECONOMIC DIVERSITY AS AN 
EDUCATION REFORM STRATEGY (Richard D. Kahlenberg ed., 2012).  
 288. A similar sadness comes to mind when one considers the day Brown I was decided 
and then fast forwards to the results in the twenty-first century. Consider the words of former 
U.S. Senator from Missouri Thomas Eagleton: ―If someone had told us in 1954 what the 
situation would be in 2004, I would have told them, ‗You‘re out of your mind. This is a 
landmark case, one that will trigger the fall of racial barriers.‘‖ Jake Wagman, Struggle Against 
Segregation Goes On. Many Still go to School With Those Who Look Like Them, ST. LOUIS 
POST-DISPATCH, May 16, 2004, at A1.  
 289. St. Louis was recently identified as being one of the top ten most segregated cities in 
America. See, e.g., Earl Ofari Hutchinson, Still Segregated After All These Years, ST. LOUIS 
AM. (Apr. 7, 2011), http://www.stlamerican.com/news/columnists/article_141b844e-60ca-
11e0-8a4e-001cc4c03286.html; see also Chris Smith, BBC Reports Delmar Is A Racial 
Dividing Line In St. Louis (Mar. 14, 2012), http://fox2now.com/2012/03/14/bbc-reports-delmar-
is-a-racial-dividing-line-in-st-louis/. See also supra note 278 and accompanying text. 
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resources of concerned Americans at every level of public and 
private life.
290
 
These words were written in 1967. The sad reality, as Mrs. Freeman 
noted at the commemoration of the Liddell lawsuit at Washington 
University School of Law in March of 2012, is that she could have 
written those same words today. 
I am not quite sure what we have learned from the past forty years 
of struggle for quality education in St. Louis. There are obviously 
hard lessons about the toll on families, on health, on lives, on futures, 
on dreams. There are hard lessons about the inability of the law to 
solve all problems. And there are hard lessons about the enduring 
stigma of race.
291
 Quality education remains elusive in 2012, though. 
This we know for sure. And Minnie would not like it one bit. One of 
her most prophetic statements was made in 1996 when she told 
legislators that if the issue of quality public education were not 
addressed we would all ―pay for it.‖292 And that we are. Aside from 
the challenges in public education nationally,
293
 St. Louis today is, 
per capita, one of the most dangerous cities in the nation.
294
 I think 
we all know the correlation between education and crime.
295
 
 
 290. U.S. COMM‘N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, RACIAL ISOLATION IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS: 
SUMMARY OF REPORT BY THE U.S. COMM‘N ON CIVIL RIGHTS NO. 7, 21 (CCR Clearinghouse 
Publ‘n) (1967). 
 291. As cities become more and more segregated, so do their schools. St. Louis is an 
example of that. See OGLETREE, supra note 94, at 261–64. But even in completely integrated 
cities, segregated education thrives. Consider the following on the growing segregation of the 
New York City public school system: 
In the broad resegregation of the nation's schools that has transpired over recent 
decades, New York‘s public-school system looms as one of the most segregated. 
While the city's public-school population looks diverse—40.3 percent Hispanic, 32 
percent black, 14.9 percent white and 13.7 percent Asian—many of its schools are 
nothing of the sort. About 650 of the nearly 1,700 schools in the system have 
populations that are 70 percent a single race, a New York Times analysis of schools 
data for the 2009–10 school year found; more than half the city's schools are at least 90 
percent black and Hispanic. 
N.R. Kleinfield, A System Divided: ‗Why Don‘t We Have Any White Kids?‘, N.Y. TIMES, May 
13, 2012, at MB1. See also A Rotting Apple, supra note 283. 
 292. See, e.g., supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
 293. See generally, e.g., OUR PROMISE: ACHIEVING EDUCATIONAL EQUALITY FOR 
AMERICA‘S CHILDREN (Maurice R. Dyson & Daniel B. Weddle eds., 2009). 
 294. Paul Friswold, St. Louis Is the Third-Most Dangerous City, RIVERFRONT TIMES 
BLOGS (June 14, 2012), http://blogs.riverfronttimes.com/dailyrft/2012/06/st_louis_third-most_ 
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Twenty-seven years after the filing of her lawsuit, Minnie said 
―this has been a long time coming, yet we have just begun.‖296 Little 
did Minnie, or any of us, realize that some thirteen years after her 
statement, the beginning has barely begun. 
 
dangerous_city.php?page =2. 
 295. See, e.g., Randall G. Shelden, Education as Crime Prevention, CENTER ON JUVENILE 
& CRIMINAL JUSTICE (Apr. 1, 2011), http://www.cjcj.org/post/juvenile/justice/education/crime/ 
prevention.  
 296. Rick Pierce & Carolyn Bower, Settlement is Reached in Desegregation Case, ST. 
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 7, 1999, at A1 (quoting Minnie Liddell shortly after the 1999 
Settlement Agreement was approved by Judge Limbaugh). 
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